Jabhat al-Nusrah's Abu Muhammad al-Jolani: "Of course we won’t be bound by [Riyadh]."

Below are some notes on Jabhat al-Nusrah chief Abu Muhammad al-Jolani’s recent “press conference,” which aired on December 12. In the conference, al-Jolani entertained questions from Mousa al-Omar of al-Ghad al-Arabi, Adham Abul-Husam of Al Jazeera, Muhammad al-Feisal of Orient and independent celebrity activist Hadi al-Abdullah. These notes aren’t meant to be comprehensive – there’s more to the conference, which is worth watching in full – but they do highlight a few of the things I thought were most interesting.

Destroy the Riyadh Conference

So al-Jolani’s main theme here is “burn down the Riyadh conference,” more or less. (The press conference was apparently recorded before Riyadh but released afterwards.) Al-Jolani argues that the Riyadh conference is integrally related to the Vienna negotiations process, which he says will retain President Bashar al-Assad in power, integrate opposition brigades with the regime’s military, and then compel them to turn on Nusrah, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and others viewed as jihadist irreconcilables.

Al-Jolani not only attacks the conference itself, but really goes in on rebel brigade participants, accusing them of “treason” for playing along with this international conspiracy. In what I thought was most shocking, he attempted to destroy the credibility of any agreement with rebel buy-in by arguing that, in fact, these brigade representatives exert no real command and control over their units on the ground and can’t compel them to abide by any agreement. This is the sort of argument that is a real dagger in the heart of any negotiations process because, after all, if rebel leadership can’t actually restrain their footsoldiers, then no agreement means anything. It’s also pretty insulting to the brigades that chose to endorse or participate in the conference, which is more or less everyone to the left of al-Qaeda.

Muhammad al-Feisal, Orient News: “Returning to the Riyadh conference, will you be bound by the Riyadh resolutions on the ground?”

Al-Jolani: “Of course we won’t be bound by any of it. We won’t abide by [these outcomes], and in fact we’ll work to make them fail.”

Al-Feisal: “And their impact on the ground, what do you expect?”

Al-Jolani: “I don’t think that anyone who went to negotiate at the Riyadh conference is capable of implementing [any agreement], even if he repeats whatever was dictated to him or impressed upon him. I don’t think he’s capable of implementing anything he promised on the ground.”

19:24-20:04

Battlefield Optimism

Al-Jolani also offers a pretty strikingly optimistic take on rebels and jihadists’ battlefield progress, arguing that negotiations have only resurfaced as an international priority because the regime continues to weaken and lose ground. Al-Jolani’s rejectionist stance on negotiations basically requires him to adopt this line so he can claim that acquiescence to talks and a negotiated resolution amounts, more or less, to seizing defeat from the jaws of victory. Still, in arguing for such a rosy outlook, al-Jolani occasionally contorts himself into weird positions. For example, he claims that the regime controls only 20 percent of Syrian territory, which is arguably true – but only if you exclude the country’s central Badiyyah wasteland, ISIS territory, and areas held by the Kurdish PYD/YPG. By that sort of reckoning, I’d guess that mixed rebels and non-ISIS jihadists probably don’t hold much more than 20 percent of the country themselves.

ISIS as a Second-Order Threat

While al-Jolani doesn’t seem to be inching towards a reconciliation with ISIS, he also makes it clear that fighting ISIS is not an urgent priority for Nusrah and that he’s personally uninterested in capturing Syrian public support by claiming to fight ISIS. When he discusses the northern Aleppo front, for example, he says that even before Nusrah withdrew south over concerns about the legitimacy of collaborating with Turkey and the international Coalition, Nusrah was not fighting ISIS or manning the front lines against the group. And in later discussing al-Qaeda’s historic victories and vanguard role, he claims both Afghanistan and Iraq as victories for al-Qaeda and defeats for America – somewhat odd considering that ISIS ate up al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Iraqi jihad has turned out to be, realistically, a total mess.

Combative Questioning

I think I’m still in shock from seeing the head of a Jabhat al-Nusrah affiliate subject himself to open and occasionally challenging questioning. Through the conference, these journalists and activists interrupt or push back on al-Jolani in a way that is very different from some of the staged “interviews” Nusrah has released previously.

Hadi al-Abdullah stands out for putting al-Jolani in a genuinely difficult spot in several instances. Take, for example, al-Abdullah’s question about Nusrah arresting FSA commanders, which prompted al-Jolani’s controversial denial that there’s such a thing as the “Free Syrian Army.” (I’m less exercised about this than some for reasons I’ve tweeted about previously.) Orient’s al-Feisal follows up with a question about Nusrah’s Dar al-Qada judiciary, which prompts al-Abdullah to offer a pretty real interjection:

Al-Feisal, Orient News: “A question from the street: If someone has a grievance about Jabhat al-Nusrah or about a detainee or something like that, where should he go?”

Al-Jolani: “He can go to the branches of Dar al-Qada, which are for the public. And there’s an office to receive complaints…”

Hadi al-Abdullah, interrupting: “Sheikh, Dar al-Qada, in one way or another, belong to Jabhat al-Nusrah. When someone goes [to Dar al-Qada], Nusrah becomes both the opposing party and the judge.”

Al-Jolani: “Jabhat al-Nusrah supports Dar al-Qada, but its judiciary is entirely independent. We provide it with support, we sponsor it, but its judiciary is totally independent. And those working in it, more than 80 percent of them, or about 80 percent, are independent. They don’t have any link to Jabhat al-Nusrah or anything like that…”

49:15-50:07

So, first of all, al-Abdullah is right. With the seeming exception of Hreitan (Aleppo), Dar al-Qada is basically a Jabhat al-Nusrah project that is not seen as effectively independent. But by challenging al-Jolani like this, al-Abdullah is calling into question the core of Nusrah’s governing program in northern Syria, of which Dar al-Qada is right at the heart. And he’s doing it to al-Jolani’s face, it’s bonkers.

The Al-Qaeda Affiliation

Short version, Jabhat al-Nusrah is not going to break its link with al-Qaeda. Al-Jolani doesn’t even promise to split with al-Qaeda if Syria’s jihadist or mujahideen factions join together to form a purely Islamic state – he says Jabhat al-Nusrah will be among the first soldiers of that state, but I don’t think that even implies Jabhat al-Nusrah will dissolve itself. He also continues to distance Nusrah from terrorist attacks abroad in only the most narrow terms. He says al-Qaeda has other people who handle those things, but Jabhat al-Nusrah just fights in Syria – for now.

Al-Jolani: “At this time, Jabhat al-Nusrah isn’t concerned with anything but fighting Bashar al-Assad and Hizbullah, who are hurting the people of Syria. Al-Qaeda has many roles that are divided; not everyone has the same role. Maybe al-Qaeda has people who fight America or work in Europe, but our mission is just…” (interrupted)

52:55-53:16

Jabhat al-Nusrah leader on splits in Egyptian Brotherhood: “And that’s what jihadists are waiting for…”

Below I’ve translated a series of tweets from Abu Obeida al-Gharib, a leader in Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrah. He weighs in at length on divisions within the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which was mostly decapitated after Egypt’s 2013 coup and has since been split between a militant youth wing and a more circumspect old guard.

Al-Gharib – who may himself be Egyptian, although I can’t say that definitively – provides a sort of outside, jihadist perspective on the Brotherhood’s splits and how its leadership have struggled with how far to take violent revolutionary action. He also refers more or less matter-of-factly to the Brotherhood’s links to various nascent militant organizations, including al-Uqab al-Thouri (Revolutionary Punishment). (For more on the new rise of Egypt militancy, see Mokhtar Awad and Mostafa Hashem’s recent “Egypt’s Escalating Islamist Insurgency.”)

Anyway, read for the narrative, but stick around for the final, closing punch. Spoiler alert: Jihadists may not love any wing of the Brotherhood, youth or old guard, but they do have a vested interest in how this debate shakes out.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is witnessing a sharp division between its older and youth trends. The youth trend within the Brotherhood thinks there has to be new mechanisms to confront Egypt’s coup, including popular and armed confrontation in addition to protests.

The youth trend in the Egyptian Brotherhood took control of the organization’s field leadership for a period after the first and most of the second tier of its leadership was arrested. That resulted in the establishment of two wings to confront the security forces and the military: one military wing, represented by the groups of al-Uqab al-Thouri (Revolutionary Retribution); and one semi-military wing, the groups of al-Muqawamah al-Sha’biyyah (the Popular Resistance).

The goal of the groups of al-Uqab al-Thouri was to carry out purely military operations targeting the Egyptian security services and army. As for al-Muqawamah al-Sha’biyyah, it was meant to target security and army vehicles randomly and burn them with Molotov cocktails and other means. That was done randomly by different groups of young people who would move in all the streets and neighborhoods.

What was left of the old leadership inside the country and the leadership abroad turned a blind eye to what the youth were doing for a while so they could pressure the Egyptian regime and its security services. But the scope of [the youth’s] action started to expand, and the leadership started to feel that things were getting out of their control, that Egypt was on its way towards becoming a new Algeria, and so they decided to back off.

That’s when this clash happened between the old leadership and the youth leadership, who rejected this. The youth decided to continue their action, without paying attention to the old leadership, and in particular those leaders outside the country. The external leadership and those remaining senior figures inside the country cut off funding from the youth leadership and the families of the martyrs, detainees, and fugitives from the security services in an effort in an effort to split the Brotherhood’s membership from the youth leadership. And they managed to do it, and they regained control over the Brotherhood.

The dispute returned again with the approach of the anniversary of the January Revolution and calls to revive the revolution in Egypt, and it manifested itself in the removal of Brotherhood spokesman [Muhammad Muntasser]. The old leadership of the Brotherhood wants to rule out confrontation as an option because they know that the rug will pulled out from under them, and that things will get out of control in Eygpt. They want to keep the matter to either [Egyptian President Abdulfattah] al-Sisi or [deposed President Muhammad] Morsi. And other option is rejected, even if it’s in the interest of Muslims and sparing them from slavery and oppression.

[Abu Obeida shares a series of related headlines from Al Jazeera and Al-Islamiyun.]

The return of Muhammad Muntasser as official spokesman of the Brotherhood is the first real victory of the youth trend inside the group. Muhammad Muntasser: “The dispute inside the Brotherhood is one between the reformist and revolutionary wings. Those who lead the Brotherhood are its members inside the country, not abroad. And we won’t allow anyone to dictate to us from abroad. I don’t know anything about a deal between the Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood abroad, but what is for sure is that we’ll continue on the revolutionary path.”

It the revolutionary youth line succeeds in dominating the Brotherhood inside Egypt, that means a direct, intense confrontation with the security services.

And that’s what jihadists are waiting for…

الاخوان المسلمين فى مصر يشهدون انقسامأ حادا بين التيار القديم وتيار الشباب فيه

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

التيار الشبابى داخل الاخوان يرى بوجوب وجود اليات جديدة لمواجهة اﻹنقلاب بمصر بما فيها المواجهة الشعبية والمسلحة الى جانب المظاهرات

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

سيطر تيار الشباب فى إخوان مصر فترة من الزمن على مقاليد القيادة الميدانية بعد اعتقال الصف الاول وأغلب الصف الثانى فنتج عن ذلك

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

إنشاء جناحين احدهما عسكرى وتمثل فى مجموعات العقاب الثورى وشبه عسكرى فى مجموعات المقاومة الشعبية لمواجهة قوات الامن والجيش

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

مجموعات العقاب الثورى كان هدفها عمليات عسكرية بحته تستهدف الامن والجيش المصريين ،أما المقاومة الشعبية فهى ﻻستهداف سيارات الامن والجيش

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

بشكل عشوائى وحرقها بالملتوف او غيره وتتم بشكل عشوائى من مجموعات شبابية متنوعه تتحرك فى كافة الشوارع والاحياء

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

غضت القيادة القديمة المتبقية فى الداخل الى جانب قيادة الخارج الطرف عن الشباب لبعض الوقت من باب الضغط ع النظام المصرى وأجهزة أمنه

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

ولكن بدأت رقعة العمل تتسع وزادت وأحست القيادة أن اﻹمور بدأت بالخروج عن السيطرة وأن مصر تتجه لجزائر جديدة فقررت التراجع

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

هنا حدث الصدام بينهم وبين القيادات الشبابية الرافضة لهذا الامر وقرر الشباب اﻹستمرار ف العمل دون اﻹلتفات لقرارت القيادة القديمة بالذات الخارج

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

قامت القيادات الخارجية وبقايا القدامى بالداخل عبر قطع التمويل عن القيادات الشبابية وأسر الشهداء والمعتقلين والمطاردين من أجهزة الامن

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

فى محاولة لفض جماهير الجماعة عن القيادات الشبابية وبالفعل تم لهم ما أرادوا وأعادوا السيطرة على مفاصل الجماعة

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

عاد الخلاف من جديد مع اقتراب موعد ذكرى ثورة يناير والدعوات ﻹحياء الثورة من جديد فى مصر وتجلى فى قضية عزل المتحدث الرسمى للإخوان

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

القيادات القديمة للإخوان تريد إستبعاد خيار المواجهة ﻹنهم يعلمون ان البساط سيسحب من تحت أقدامهم وسيخرج اﻷمر عن السيطرة فى مصر

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

هم يريدون حصر القضية أما السيسى وأما مرسى أى خيار أخر فهو مرفوض حتى لو فيه مصلحة للمسلمين وخلاصهم من العبودية والظلم

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

10 مكاتب إدارية لجماعة #الإخوان ترفض قرارت مجموعة عزت بإقالة #محمد_منتصر #محمد_منتصر_يمثلني https://t.co/PalspooMMC pic.twitter.com/6dZ2wLRqYB

— الإسلاميون (@islamioon) December 15, 2015

#محمد_عبدالرحمن أحد أقطاب طرفى الازمة داخل #الإخوان يوجه رسالة إلى الثوار https://t.co/wIVVD2bIjA #التحالف_الاسلامي pic.twitter.com/iMvfdW7RnU

— الإسلاميون (@islamioon) December 15, 2015

اللجنة الادارية العليا للإخوان: #محمد_منتصر متحدثا اعلاميا للجماعة https://t.co/4bHaVaRT3c https://t.co/KFVld8Msb0

— الإسلاميون (@islamioon) December 15, 2015

هذا التصريح يلخص لك أسباب الصراع بين أقطاب اﻹخوان@ajmubasher

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

عودة محمد المنتصر متحدثا رسميا لﻻخوان هو أول نصر حقيقى للتيار الشبابى داخل الجماعة

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

محمد منتصر : الخلاف داخل الجماعة هو خلاف بين التيار اﻻصلاحى والتيار الثورى #الإخوان_المسلمين

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 16, 2015

محمد منتصر : من يقود الاخوان هم اخوان الداخل لا الخارج ولن نقبل ان يملى علينا شىء من الخارج #الإخوان_المسلمين

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 16, 2015

محمد منتصر: ليس لدى معلومة هل هناك صفقة بين النظام المصرى وأخوان الخارج ولكن اﻷكيد أننا سنستمر فى النهج الثورى #الإخوان_المسلمين

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 16, 2015

فى حال نجاح الخط الثورى الشبابى ف الجماعة ف السيطرة على الاخوان داخل مصر يعنى حدوث صدام مباشر وقوى مع أجهزة الأمن وهو ماينتظره الجهاديون ..

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 16, 2015

VICE News: "Syrian Rebels Took One Very Small Step Closer to Negotiating an End to the War"

New from me for VICE News:

At a meeting in Riyadh this week, the fractious Syrian opposition made its most encouraging progress to date towards forming a single political front. But after the last-minute withdrawal of major Salafist rebel brigade Ahrar al-Sham, will that be enough?

https://news.vice.com/article/syrian-rebels-took-one-very-small-step-closer-to-negotiating-an-end-to-the-war

VICE News: "Syria's Newest Rebel Army Has Its Sights on the Islamic State"

New from me for VICE News:

Meet the New Syrian Army, a force of eastern Syrian rebels who want to liberate their home province of Deir al-Zour from ISIS and have U.S.-issued weaponry and international Coalition air strikes on their side. They face long odds — their numbers are low, in part because other rebels are dubious about their international backing — but they may still be the best chance to taking back Deir.

https://news.vice.com/article/syrias-newest-rebel-army-has-its-sights-on-the-islamic-state

Top Jabhat al-Nusrah shar'i attacks Jeish al-Islam, highlights broader jihadist anxieties

Below we see Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrah’s top shari’ah official Sami al-Oreidi issue an unusually direct attack on top leadership in Jeish al-Islam, the most powerful rebel faction in Damascus’s East Ghouta suburbs. Al-Oreidi’s tweets (translated below) make clear that members of Nusrah’s top leadership share and endorse hardline jihadists’ hostility to Jeish al-Islam and its leader, Zahran Alloush. They also speak to broader anxieties among Syria’s jihadists as they attempt to coexist, often uncomfortably, with other political and ideological trends within the Syrian opposition.

Al-Oreidi is apparently annoyed over comments from Jeish al-Islam leader and religious figure Sheikh Sami (Abu Abdurrahman) Ka’ka’ criticizing Jabhat al-Nusrah for shelling Damascus city after an aborted Russian-brokered ceasefire that would have allowed relief into the besieged East Ghouta suburbs. (I’ve been unable to find Ka’ka’s original comments.) Al-Oreidi reproaches Jeish al-Islam for its own overreach and, somewhat more dramatically, endorses premiere Salafi-jihadist theorist Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s comparison between the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the “Alalish” – Zahran Alloush’s supporters, or Jeish al-Islam.

Al-Oreidi’s comments are in one sense a product of personality clashes and local, Damascus-area politics. Jihadists have long been hostile to Jeish al-Islam and Alloush personally; in turn, Jeish al-Islam and Alloush have had a reputation for heavy-handedness in how they dealt with local political and military rivals. Recently tensions in East Ghouta have spiked amid jostling over control of smuggling tunnels into East Ghouta and allegations that Jeish al-Islam was behind the assassination of a local jihadist cleric and judge.

These disputes have prompted jihadists outside the Ghouta, many of whom view Alloush as an enemy-in-waiting, to weigh in. A series of leaked video and audio recordings of Jeish al-Islam leaders allegedly plotting assassinations is actually what prompted al-Maqdisi – who has controversially attacked Alloush before – to compare ISIS and the “Alalish.” Now we have apparent evidence that Jabhat al-Nusrah’s top religious official is sympathetic to al-Maqdisi’s position on Jeish al-Islam and Zahran Alloush, which seems to promise new waves of intra-rebel violence.

Al-Oreidi’s reference to “Bosnia,” though, shows that his mind is also on broader rebel-jihadist dynamics. Al-Oreidi’s allusion to his remarks to now-deceased Ahrar al-Sham leader Hassan Abboud (Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi) refers to their sharp back-and-forth over the “Revolutionary Covenant” that was announced in May 2014. “They say, ‘We don’t want the Iraqi tragedy to repeat itself,’” wrote al-Oreidi at the time, “but they are heading towards a new Bosnian tragedy, on Syrian soil. Save yourselves, save yourselves from the whirlpool of the past.” (For more on al-Oreidi and Abboud’s argument, see my June 2014 article on Syrian factions’ “shar’is.”)

The Revolutionary Covenant was framed in uncomfortably nationalist, non-religious terms for al-Oreidi, hence his evocation of Bosnia’s Dayton Accords. The 1995 Dayton agreement is a recurring bugbear for jihadists, who view its requirement that all foreign fighters withdraw from Bosnia (Annex 1A, Article III) as a nationalist betrayal of the jihadist foreign fighters who had sacrificed for their Muslim brothers. (Al-Oreidi is himself a foreign fighter of Palestinian-Jordanian origin.)

Jihadists fear a Dayton-style settlement in which Syria’s nationalist – or not-transnationalist, at least – rebels compromise on the jihadists’ goal of a purely Islamic state and turn on the jihadists themselves, many of whom would become stateless fugitives. In that sense, jihadists have adopted Zahran Alloush as a sort of hate object in part because he symbolizes many of jihadists’ fears and suspicions about the revolutionary context around them. He is, they think, exactly the sort of Syrian nationalist who would sell them out.

This is the sort of angst that will only intensify as regional and international actors push for a political settlement. When the next round of rebel-jihadist violence breaks out, it will likely have a local spark, but these arguments and apprehensions about the character of the Syrian state mean the stakes will be much bigger.

Translation follows. (Note: To the extent possible, I’ve maintained the odd, haiku-ish way al-Oreidi splits his individual tweets between multiple lines.)

#Truth_in_a_Tweet

When [ISIS spokesperson Abu Muhammad] al-Adnani spoke, we saw a thousand pens respond.

But when [Jeish al-Islam commander Zahran] Alloush and [top Jeish al-Islam religious official and judge Samir “Abu Abdurrahman”] Ka’ka’ slander the mujahideen,

Then we don’t hear a whisper.

It’s

#The_Brotherhood_of_No_Manhaj

#حقيقة_في_تغريدة لمّا تكلم العدناني رأينا ألف قلم يرد عليه ولما تكلم علوش وكعكة بالطعن بالمجاهدين لم نسمع لهم همسا إنها #أخوة_اللامنهج

— سامي بن محمود (@sami_mahmod2) November 28, 2015

The disastrousness of what Alloush and Ka’ka’ say

Is no less than that of al-Adnani.

What is the matter with you? How do you judge? [Quran 10:35]

Our Sheikh al-Maqdisi spoke the truth when he compared the Da’adish [derog., ISIS members] with the Alalish [derog., Alloush/Jeish al-Islam supporters].

إن الطامات الواردة في كلام علوش وكعكة لاتقل عن طامات العدناني ما لكم كيف تحكمون صدق شيخنا المقدسي لما كان يقرن بين #الدعاديش و #العلاليش

— سامي بن محمود (@sami_mahmod2) November 28, 2015

1

Ka’ka’ resembled al-Adnani

When he described Jabhat al-Nusrah’s shelling of Damascus after their supposed truce as “foolishness”

Because the regime targeted Jeish al-Islam positions afterwards.

1 كعكة شابه العدناني إذ وصف استهداف جبهة النصرة لدمشق بالقذائف بعد #هدنتهم المزعومة بالحماقة لأن النظام استهدف مواقع جيش الاسلام بعدها

— سامي بن محمود (@sami_mahmod2) November 28, 2015

2

What would he say about what [Jeish al-Islam] did – foolishness, according to Ka’ka’ and his sheikh Alloush – when they shelled Damascus.

And after that, the Duma massacre happened. Is that jihad?

What is the matter with you? How do you judge?

2 ماذا يقول عن فعلهم #حماقتهم على مذهب كعكة وشيخه علوش لما استهدفوا دمشق بالقذائف ووقعت بعدها مجزرة دوما هل هو جهاد مالكم كيف تحكمون

— سامي بن محمود (@sami_mahmod2) November 28, 2015

I said it before to [now-deceased Ahrar al-Sham head] Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi – may God have mercy on him: You say you don’t want [Syria] to be another Iraq. We say that we don’t want it to be another Bosnia.

God, may You guide us toward Your religion and put our Islamic nation on Your path.

قلتها قديما لأبي عبد الله الحموي -رحمه الله- تقولون لا تريدونها عراقا أخرى وكذلك نقول لا نريدها بوسنة أخرى اللهم أحينا لدينك وأمتنا في سبيلك

— سامي بن محمود (@sami_mahmod2) November 28, 2015

Catching Up: (Most of) 2015

Woof, I really let this blog slide.Anyway, I plan to update this more regularly as I continue to publish, if only to ensure that there's a single clearinghouse for everything I've written. (You know, in case people are interested.)Pieces I've published since my last post, in chronological order:

• Jihadology, "Abdullah al-Muheisini Weighs in on Killing of Alawite Women and Children." A translation and analysis of jihadist evangelist and dealmaker Abdullah al-Muheisini's ruling on killing Alawite women and children - he's against it, but he also includes enough caveats and qualifications that we should be worried. Al-Muheisini is extreme, but he's also influential, and he's closer to the rebel center in northwest Syria than we might like.
• Jihadology, "Ahrar al-Sham Spiritual Leader: The Idol of Democracy Has Shattered." The second piece is another translation and analysis, this one of an argument on democracy from the top spiritual leader of Syria's most powerful rebel militia, Ahrar al-Sham. This official doesn't rule out some democracy-like mechanisms, but he's pretty clear that "democracy" per se is not happening - particularly after Algeria and Egypt, he argues it's a trap for Islamists.
• War on the Rocks, "The Trouble with Turkey's Favorite Islamists" (co-authored with Aaron Stein). Turkey has good relations with a broad spectrum of Syrian rebels, but it has forged especially close ties with Ahrar al-Sham, a Salafist brigade with one foot in global jihadism. As Turkey flirts with the possibility of establishing a "safe zone" in Aleppo, it remains an open question whether Turkey will enlist Ahrar's support on the ground - and, if so, whether Ahrar can participate without also inviting in jihadist fellow travellers.
• War on the Rocks, "Ahrar al-Sham's Revisionist Jihadism." The fanaticism and brutality of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) have shocked people around the world, and Syria's "mujahideen" are no exception. Inside Syria, a revisionist critique of ISIS's hyper-extremism has emerged from within the jihadist movement, a corrective trend that's been championed by the Salafist rebels in Ahrar al-Sham. Now Ahrar al-Sham is both manning the front lines against ISIS and vying with ISIS – and al-Qaeda – to define the jihadist movement writ large.
• World Politics Review, "The End of the Army of Conquest? Syrian Rebel Alliance Shows Cracks." Over the spring and summer of this year, the Jeish al-Fateh (Army of Conquest) rebel coalition scored a series of dramatic victories over the regime of Bashar al-Assad in northwest Syria. But just as Jeish al-Fateh has announced a major new offensive, ultra-extreme faction Jund al-Aqsa has very publicly quit the coalition. The resulting acrimony has exposed the persistent and probably unresolvable divisions within Jeish al-Fatah and among Syria’s rebels more broadly.

Catching Up: Two Jihadology Pieces and Middle East Week

Apologies, super-behind in updating this blog! (Also, following me on Twitter is a much better way to stay up-to-date on anything I'm writing.)Two recent Jihadology guest pieces:

• "Recriminations on Social Media Shed Light on Jabhat al-Nusrah's Inner Workings": Ex-Nusrah shari'ah official Sultan al-Atwi returned from social media dormancy with a broadside against Nusrah, and specifically its Eastern leadership. The resulting back-and-forth shows something both about how Nusrah functions and how it's engaged major, divisive programmatic issues. Features analysis plus translations of al-Atwi's open letter and the key Nusrah responses.
• "Muhammad al-Amin on Ahrar al-Sham's Evolving Relationship with Jabhat al-Nusrah and Global Jihadism": Relative insider Sheikh Muhammad al-Amin writes about both how close Ahrar al-Sham was to Jabhat al-Nusrah and how they subsequently diverged ideologically. Features analysis and translation of al-Amin's original Facebook post.

Also, tune into my recent appearance on the Middle East Week podcast, on which I discuss the above two pieces and how Nusrah has evolved more broadly over the course of 2014.

Jeish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar Shar'i: "I bring you good news..."

Below we see Jeish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar’s top shar’i “Mu’tasim Billah al-Madani” rebut the arguments of defected shar’i “Abu Azzam al-Najdi.” Mu’tasim Billah’s response is itself enlightening, insofar as it provides a window into how jihadists understand intra-rebel dynamics and their own legitimacy.

Since his defection to ISIS, former Jeish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar shar’i Abu Azzam has continued to appeal to other jihadists to join him in what he argues is ISIS’s successful, coherent experiment of Islamic governance. He has emphasized ISIS’s most visible achievements, e.g., the implementation of the hudoud, a set of Islamic criminal punishments. He has also denigrated the dysfunction of rebel-held areas and the fact that “sincere” – that is, jihadist – fighters are sent to the fronts to be chewed up while crooks and agents of the West plot to undermine them.

Mu’tasim Billah answers by pointing to jihadists’ preferred model of Islamic law being implemented across northern Syria. In sharp contrast with the alarm of many inside and outside Syria over ISIS’s videotaped stoning of an allegedly adulterous woman in eastern Hama earlier this week, Mu’tasim Billah’s first example of God’s will being done is a stoning in Saraqeb (Idlib). He also provides a sort of map of northern jihadist areas of control, including many areas now administered by the Jabhat al-Nusrah-linked Dar al-Qadaa (Judiciary).

All of these examples flag a shift within Syria’s jihadist camp, one that seems driven by an evolving Jabhat al-Nusrah (also known as al-Qaeda in the Levant). Nusrah had previously adhered to a sort of jihadist minimalism, at least temporarily declining to implement harsh social codes like the hudoud and backing consensual structures that met a minimum level of Islamic legitimacy, such as the Aleppo Shari’ah Commission. Now, in a seeming attempt to shore up its own credibility and to retain the loyalty of jihadists who might otherwise defect to ISIS, Nusrah has been behaving more and more like circa-2013 ISIS. Nusrah is now engaging some less-reputable nationalist brigades with the same sort of sharp-elbows approach ISIS used in summer and fall of last year. It’s also begun to adopt a similar fast-forward approach to law and governance that is, arguably, religiously unsound in wartime.

Despite warnings from jihadist reformers like Nusrah’s Abu Mariyah al-Qahtani about the need for jihadist groups to purge “ghulaat” (extremists) from their ranks, Nusrah and other groups seem to have responded to ISIS’s ideological threat by becoming more like ISIS – catering to their own most extreme members by competing to implement Islamic rule here and now. That’s why we see Mu’tasim Billah mustering these examples when arguing with Abu Azzam; in an intra-jihadist argument, stonings are a badge of pride.

(Also of note: That the areas Mu’tasim Billah says are either under jihadist control or that of jihadists’ nationalist rebel frenemies like Jamal Ma’rouf are so discombobulated geographically is just further evidence of what a patchwork things are in the rebel north.)

Translation follows:

I bring you good news…

The hudoud (Islamic criminal punishments) have begun to be implemented. The brothers in Saraqeb (Idlib) carried out a sentence of death by stoning…

@aboazaam122 أبشرك .. أن الحدود بدأت تقام ، فالإخوة في سراقب أقاموا حد الرجم ..

— المعتصم بالله (@Mo3tasimbeallah) October 24, 2014

You know that in the sincere brothers’ areas, they’re the ones in control. The Dar al-Qadaa (Judiciary) in Hreitan (Aleppo) and the surrounding area is what governs. And in Saraqeb, Sarmin, Sarmada, Harem, Salqin (all western Idlib), the coast (Lattakia) and Khan Sheikhoun (southern Idlib), the ones in control are our brothers.

@aboazaam122 تعرف أنه في مناطق الإخوة الصادقين هم المسيطرين فدار القضاء في حريتان وما حولها هي الحاكمة وفي سراقب وسرمين وسرمداوحارم وسليقين

— المعتصم بالله (@Mo3tasimbeallah) October 24, 2014

@aboazaam122 والساحل وخان شيخون المسيطر فيها الاخوة

— المعتصم بالله (@Mo3tasimbeallah) October 24, 2014

[Liwa Shuhada Badr’s Khalid] Hayani doesn’t reach beyond [Aleppo neighborhood] Beni Zeid, [the Syrian Revolutionary Front’s Jamal] Ma’rouf is in Jebel al-Zawiyah (Idlib), and [Harakat] Hazm are in their areas…

@aboazaam122 والحياني لا يتحاوز بني زيد ، ومعروف في جبل الزاوية وحزم في مناطقهم ،،

— المعتصم بالله (@Mo3tasimbeallah) October 24, 2014

Abu Azzam al-Najdi: "No one has a successful plan to implement God’s law except the Islamic State."

Below we see Jeish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA) shar’i “Abu Azzam al-Najdi’s” frank rationale for leaving JMA to join the Islamic State (IS / ISIS). Jeish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar is a mostly foreign fighter battalion that has been active in Aleppo. It is best known for its Caucasian (e.g., Chechen) contingent, but it also counts Arabs among its ranks — it recently absorbed the heavily Saudi al-Katibah al-Khadra (the Green Battalion), and Abu Azzam’s nom du guerre indicates that he hails from the Najd (east Saudi Arabia). Abu Azzam had been JMA’s shar’i and, at least in Arabic media, its main fundraising point of contact. Saudi fundraiser and ideologue Abdullah al-Muheisini had recommended as late as April that any would-be foreign fighters should reach out specifically to Abu Azzam.

Abu Azzam defected to ISIS alongside a substantial chunk of al-Katibah al-Khadra, including its commander Omar Seif and at least one of its shar’is. (Seif had apparently just been detained by the Syrian Revolutionaries Front on suspicions, now vindicated, that he was linked to ISIS. Other jihadists intervened to broker his release.)

As can be seen below, there are a number of strains to Abu Azzam’s thinking, or at least what he’s willing to disclose of it. Some of it reads like picking a winner: on the one hand, an endorsement of ISIS’s success in building a functional Islamic state; on the other, disillusionment with the dysfunction of rebel-controlled areas and a clear distrust of non-jihadist rebels. The current U.S./Coalition campaign on ISIS apparently figures into his logic, too, pushing him to advocate jihadist solidarity with ISIS to better resist “the nations of disbelief.”

ISIS and pro-ISIS accounts have been crowing about successive jihadist defections to ISIS, doing everything they can to advertise ISIS’s continuing momentum. When it comes to drawing away foreign fighters, I suspect they’re right – Abu Azzam is not the first to defect to ISIS, and I doubt he’ll be the last.

I’ve been asked a lot about my reason for leaving [Jeish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar] and pledging allegiance to the Islamic State.

I would say, frankly, that no one has a successful plan to implement God’s law except the Islamic State. It has established Islamic courts and implemented the hudoud (Islamic criminal punishments) in its territory. Meanwhile, if we go and look at the other side, we find not only sincere battalions but also – on the same land –  criminal battalions and apostate battalions supported by the military councils that call openly for the establishment of a democratic state. Then we fight on the fronts while they work behind us to carry out their projects and plots… Yes, there are those who work [at that], but they’ll never succeed – although only God knows – because of their division and fragmentation. Even the courts that have been established have seen what they’ve seen because of nepotism and what have you…

You might say that the [Islamic] State has made mistakes. I say that they themselves admit these mistakes, and they work to rectify them and hold accountable the responsible party. They’ve established Islamic courts and implemented the hudoud, so you see nothing here but the rule of Islamic law. Stores close at prayer time, women are modest in the markets, nobody sells cigarettes or anything else.

I say this is not the time for division with the Islamic state. The nations of disbelief have gathered against us, so we must come to [the Islamic State’s] aid. This is not the time for the division of “groups.” Rather, it is the time for solidarity and union.

Below are Abu Azzam’s original tweets:

١- الحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة والسلام على أفضل الخلق نبينا محمد وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين.. سألت كثيرا سبب خروجي ومبايعتي للدولة الإسلامية..

— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014

2- أقول صراحة لا يوجد أحد لديه مشروع ناجح لتطبيق شرع الله إلا في الدولة الإسلامية فقد أقامت المحاكم الإسلامية وطبقت الحدود على أرضها أما لو

— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014

3- ذهبنا لننظر في الجهة المقابلة لوجدنا على نفس الأرض كتائب صادقة وكتائب مفسدة وكتائب مرتدة مدعومة من المجالس العسكرية التي تدعوا لإقامة

— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014

4- دولة ديمقراطية صراحة , ثم نحن نقاتل في الجبهات وهم يسعون من خلفنا لإقامة مشاريعهم ومخططاتهم.. نعم هناك من يسعى ولكن لن يستطيعوا والله

— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014

5- أعلم بسبب تفرقهم وتشرذمهم.. حتى المحاكم التي قامت حصل فيها ماحصل بسبب المحسوبيات وغيرها.. قد تقولون يوجد عند الدولة أخطاء..

— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014

6- أقول هم أنفسهم يقرون أن عندهم أخطاء وهم يسعون في إصلاحها ومحاسبة المخطأ وقد أقاموا المحاكم الإسلامية وأقيمت الحدود فلا ترى هنا إلا معالم

— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014

7- تحكيم الشريعة فالمحلات تغلق وقت الصلوات والنساء محتشمات في الأسواق ولا أحد يبيع الدخان في المحلات وغير ذلك.. أقول ليس هذا وقت الخلاف

— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014

8- مع الدولة الإسلامية فأمم الكفر قد اجتمعت عليها فالواجب مناصرتها.. وليس هذا وقت تفرق الجماعات بل هو وقت الإعتصام والإجتماع..

— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014

Suqour al-Sham commander: "Our land can’t bear a proxy war."

Below is Suqour al-Sham / Islamic Front commander Abu Ammar’s response to impending U.S. intervention in Syria. Unsurprisingly, after America’s stop-and-start support for rebels and recurring rumors that Ahrar al-Sham or the entire Islamic Front would be designated as terrorists, he is not in love with the idea.

One idea worth bearing in mind when evaluating American intervention in Syria is “path dependence,” the idea that your previous action (or inaction) bounds the options currently available to you. Goodwill towards America among Syria’s rebels – while not necessarily exhausted – is a wasting asset, one that has been depleted as the war has dragged on without meaningful American support for rebels. When America was considering action in August and September 2013, the rebels most unfriendly to a U.S. role were substantially less powerful and dug into areas outside regime control. I don’t think it’s controversial to say that America is going to have a much tougher time finding partners now than it would have last year.

For three years, the Syrian people have tasted the al-Assad regime’s artistry at torture, murder and displacement. Thousands of children, women and the elderly have been killed; prisons filled; millions made homeless; and women raped. All this in full view of the world and its [Security] Council, which met time and again to no avail, and which never moved a muscle.

Instead, it acted to designate some of the factions working to end the oppression of this bereaved people as “terrorists,” and it threatened the same for others.

God willing, we’re able to topple the al-Assad regime and repel Da’ish’s [ISIS] aggression without foreign intervention. To aid our people, it’s enough to stop aiding the al-Assad regime and its minions and to pull away its cover, as well as not tightening the screws on the factions working to topple al-Assad.

Our land can’t bear a proxy war. It can't bear more settling of scores and more experiments on our wounded people.

Ahrar al-Sham's Abu Yazan: "It’s our country and our revolution."

Below is a translation of Ahrar al-Sham shar’i-commander “Abu Yazan’s” apparent response to Jordanian Salafi-jihadist theorist Eyad Quneibi. Quneibi has attracted sharply critical responses – particularly from prominent Ahrar leadership – for his non-specific warnings against cooperation with Syrian factions that are Western agents and are otherwise tainted. In this 3 September response, we see Abu Yazan rebuke not only (an unnamed) Quneibi, but also ideas of Salafi-jihadist purism more broadly. This is quite striking coming from a leader in Ahrar, which has itself flirted with Salafi-jihadism but now may have reverted to a more nationalist brand of (still hardline) Salafism.

O enlightened one,

We have a saying in al-Sham (Syria): “If someone won’t come, you have to go with him.”¹ The One Most High said, “And when they meet those who believe, they say, ‘We believe.’ But when they are left to their devils, they say, ‘Truly, we are with you; we were only jesting.’” As for presenting this like it’s a matter of defending [Jabhat] al-Nusra, dear brother, we and al-Nusra are in the same boat, and it’s called “the Syrian jihad.” When people like you – may God bless you – and like al-Maqdisi in his last publications echo the culture of takhwin (accusations of treason), whisper campaigns and casting aspersions on any faction that isn’t Salafi-jihadist with obtuse, airy turns of phrase, then al-Nusra is pushed towards becoming a movement of societal isolation, and we fear it might evolve into a movement of societal rejection. So we say to you, Fear God for the sake of the battlefield. The battlefield can’t sustain this. Believe me, we care for al-Nusra more – God willing – than you and al-Maqdisi, and the days to come will show this. And even before that, we care more for the Syrian battlefield, because it’s our country and our revolution. (Of course, I assume our dear brother al-Muheisini would say this is ‘Sykes-Picot’  .) So know, my brothers from all factions – from Hazm to al-Nusra – yes, I was Salafi-jihadist, and I was imprisoned in the regime’s jails for it. Today, I ask for God’s forgiveness and repent to Him, and I apologize to our people for involving them in Quixotic battles of which they have no need. I apologize for being apart from you for even a day, as when I exited my intellectual prison and mingled with you and with your hearts, I said that the Prophet, peace be upon him, spoke true when he said, “If the people of al-Sham are corrupted, then there is no good in you.” I apologize to you, and God willing, the days to come will be better than those past – for our revolution and for our Islam.

And to those who reproach me for being harsh in my speech, I say:

“He was harsh, and so was reproached. Let he who would be wise sometimes be harsh and sometimes be merciful.”

And I ask God for forgiveness if I’ve erred, and may God reward you for your advice.

Also, for anyone who missed my June Foreign Policy article on Syrian rebel shar’is (jurists), here it is.

1. The saying, to my knowledge, basically means that if someone can’t be made to do/understand something, you have to walk him through it yourself.

Bishara on Syria: "The people are the ones who turned out to be strong!"

The above is a selection from Azmi Bishara’s appearance on the May 20 episode of Al Jazeera’s “Fil-‘Umq” (In Depth), titled either “Challenges Facing the Syrian Revolution” or “The Syrian Revolution at a Crossroads.”

Bishara is one of the Arab world’s leading public intellectuals (and, reportedly, a key influence on Qatari foreign policy). Here he helps contextualize Syrian-American relations, both before and since the revolution.

The real nut of this should be evident from the title of this post, though. Circa 2:20, Bishara upends much of the discussion of the Syrian regime’s strength. It’s some key perspective that helps re-frame the balance of power inside Syria and  makes clear the real strength of the Syrian people and the opposition rebels.

This still doesn’t mean that the fall of the regime is somehow a foregone conclusion. It should, however, suggest why it will be so difficult for the Syrian regime to break the back of this rebellion.

King Bashar

Here’s something I wrote earlier today. Forgive me if it’s a little too inside. The Gause-Yom piece I discuss, by the way, comes highly recommended.

(Also, I forgot to post my Foreign Policy article earlier, so please read that if you haven’t.)

King Bashar: What the Survival of the Arab Monarchs Tells Us About the Assad Regime

The staying power of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime has left many perplexed. Since 2011’s wave of Arab revolution, Assad has outlasted his contemporaries among the region’s republican autocrats. President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, President Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen are all (basically) finished.

The Arab monarchs, on the other hand, have persisted. From Morocco to Saudi Arabia to Oman, the Arab world’s monarchies weathered unrest and emerged whole. Even Bahrain, which faced the monarchies’ most regime-threatening uprising, is intact.

It’s a phenomenon of survival for which Sean L. Yom and F. Gregory Gause III offer a compelling logic in their Journal of Democracy article “Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchs Hang On.” They cast that survival in strategic terms – and, reading the article this week, I couldn’t help but think that those terms also describe the Assad regime.

It may make sense, then, to think of Syria not as one of the last Arab republics standing, but rather as one of a host of Arab monarchies that refuse to die. The framework put forward by Yom and Gause might help explain how Assad has lasted so long – and why he could last substantially longer.

The central conceit of Yom and Gause’s article is a metric for longevity: three strategic factors for regime survival, of which each Arab monarchy possesses at least two. They dismiss explanations for monarchic survival based on the monarchies’ unique cultural legitimacy or their ability to remain above the political fray. Rather, the Arab kings, sultans, and emirs have survived by means of: 1) cross-cutting coalitions; 2) hydrocarbon rents; and 3) foreign patronage.

None of these factors are specific to monarchies, which is sort of the point – the Arab monarchies, after all, are basically just variations on autocracy. The same formula which explains the survival of Al Khalifa in Bahrain can explain the fall of Mubarak in Egypt. The Bahraini royals lacked a broad-based coalition of domestic support but had moderate hydrocarbon wealth and extreme wealth by association, as Saudi Arabia made clear that it would support the Bahraini monarchy to the hilt. In Egypt, by contrast, the decay of Egypt’s economy had hollowed out Mubarak’s popular base. Without real resource wealth to use and distribute, U.S. and Gulf support wasn’t enough to save the Egyptian president.

The Assad regime actually satisfies Yom and Gause’s definition of a monarchy – “a regime led by a hereditary sovereign who may hold varying degrees of power” – in all but name. In practice, the regime functions as an absolute monarchy, with no meaningful checks on the Assad executive. The iconography of the Assad regime – including the omnipresent portraits of Assad in shops, offices, and homes – hardly differs from the personalization of other Arab monarchies. Like them, Assad situates himself above the political fray. The state media makes clear that he is not a party to Syria’s national dialogue; rather, he only offers “notes and guidance” to “enrich” the process.

What’s most relevant, though, is that the Syrian state arguably possesses two and a half of Yom and Gause’s keys to monarchic survival. The regime isn’t resource-rich, but it’s being backstopped financially by foreign allies including Russia and Iran. So, like Bahrain, it enjoys hydrocarbon wealth indirectly – this is in addition to those countries’ apparently unlimited diplomatic and military support. Moreover, the regime’s core “cross-cutting coalition” of religious minorities and members of Syria’s Sunni majority alarmed by the prospects of Islamist rule may have frayed somewhat but seems essentially sound.

Yom and Gause’s three independent variables produce only one real dependent variable: a fall / not-fall binary. The Syrian regime’s points of commonality with the Arab monarchies help explain why it has survived until now. Moreover, given that none of these inputs are seriously threatened – Russia and Iran, for example, seem uninterested in making a trade for Assad’s head – the prospects for regime collapse according to the Yom-Gause rubric are bleak.

Of course, there are key differences between these cases. For all its bleating about Iranian conspiracy, Bahrain didn’t face the array of motivated enemies now funding and arming Syria’s opposition revolutionaries. Still, Assad’s domestic and international support give him cover for the sort of ruthless counterinsurgent campaign that could very possibly restore his control over the country.

Moreover, another point should worry those anxious to see Assad fall. As Yom and Gause note, “most of the monarchies in the Arab world today confronted social conflict early in the postcolonial era and thus rallied the coalitional pillars for their royal autocracies to survive.” The survival of this test is what separated the wheat of today’s royals from the chaff murdered by Nasserists in the streets of Baghdad.

If Assad survives, this war could be another Hama: a deadly threat to the regime that ultimately leaves it stronger. It seems that the evolution of Syria’s armed opposition towards Islamist militancy has only pushed Syria’s minorities and pro-regime Sunnis closer to the state. If the Syrian regime lasts for the next few years, then, it could conceivably have solidified a coalition that would allow it to last for decades more.

At that point – all nomenclature aside – it would be difficult to deny Al Assad its place next to Al Saud and Al Thani among the Arab world’s enduring monarchies.

Update: Weirdly, I forgot Qaddafi in Libya. So yes, he is also a republican autocrat who fell.

Al Jazeera Arabic: Reporter Ahmed Zeidan Tours 'Ateiba with Jabhat al-Nusra

In the above report, originally aired March 27 on Al Jazeera Arabic, we can see an example of the mainstreaming of Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) in regional media.

The report is titled (in Arabic) “Battles Between the Regime and Free Syrian Armies in al-Ghouta al-Sharqiya Outside Damascus.” As you can see from the video and the below translation, however, in this case Free Syrian Army (FSA) forces seem to have been subsumed by a JAN command.  The report, including Jazeera reporter Ahmed Zeidan apparently being walked through the town by JAN fighters and a brief interview with a JAN spokesman, arguably shows a normalizing of JAN’s role within the Syrian revolution in pan-Arab media – or, at the least, Al Jazeera.

On an unrelated note, you can see from the end of the report that Jazeera is putting a strong emphasis on the regime’s (as yet unconfirmed) use of chemical weapons.

Translation

Military reinforcements sent by Jabhat al-Nusra to the ’Ateiba area in al-Ghouta al-Sharqiya (East Ghouta), where the regime was able to cut off revolutionaries’ route to northern and southern areas several days ago. Al-Nusra’s fighters deployed across the front lines after they managed to expel the regime’s army from several buildings within the town, which drove Free Syrian Army forces to turn over control of the operations room to Jabhat al-Nusra.

Shells and bullets everywhere, including the destruction of a regime tank. Meanwhile, the Syrian regime’s army issues threats Jabhat al-Nusra, meanwhile, issues threats to the regime.

“Abu Hommam,” official spokesman of Jabhat al-Nusra in al-Ghouta: “Assad’s gangs approached from a number of directions in a desperate, failed attempt to occupy the town of ’Ateiba in order to impose a choking siege on the region. With the aid of God Most High, this invading force was repelled. A large quantity of equipment [lit. machines] and ‘Shelka’ vehicles Shilkas were destroyed; [the force] suffered grave losses of life among its soldiers, and, with the aid of God Most High, high-ranking officers were killed.”

Destruction is everywhere in the town of ’Ateiba, which is now entirely deserted. Here, a child’s swing near where a shell struck. Here, a kitchen abandoned by its owner amid the shelling around it. It seems from this house that its family fled in the night. Even chickens were not spared from the bombing.

This young man from ’Ateiba become a revolutionary and a fighter after his house, like others, was destroyed. “These houses, we invested in them with our blood all these years, all with the blessings of God, praise be to Him. What I’d like to say to the Arab nation, to this Arab Summit, is just that we want to stop this blood[shed] and killing that’s happening now in Syria.”

On the front lines, what worries some revolutionaries is the regime’s use of chemical weapons. In the rear, though, what worries civilians is the regime’s use of these heavy weapons – in addition to the use of chemical weapons.

Ahmed Zeidan, Al Jazeera, al-’Ateiba, al-Ghouta al-Sharqiya.

Translation Notes

First, I just don’t have time to put subtitles on this one. Sorry – hope everyone can follow along with the text.

I couldn’t find the vehicle make to which the JAN member refers. I guess it sounds like “Shellka” or “Chelka”? If someone chimes in with a correction, I’ll fix it.

Update: Woof, sorry, misheard one of the sentences above. The edit should be visible.

Update 2: So, this is the Shilka. Thanks to Mike and @ElSaltador for their help!

Moaz al-Khatib Speech at the Arab Summit: March 26, 2013

Translation follows:

Greetings (al-salam alaikum) to you from a brave people, a quarter of whom have become homeless; and 200,000 of whose sons have been put in prisons; and who have paid a price for their freedom close to 100,000 martyrs; and whose country (infrastructure) has been destroyed at the hands of a mad, barbaric regime.

Greetings from a people that has been butchered in full sight of the world for two years and has been bombarded with all kinds of heavy weaponry and ballistic missiles while some governments still scratch their heads, wondering what to do.

Greetings from the only people in the world whom warplanes bomb in bakeries so that they might emerge drenched in the blood of women and children. Greetings from the widows and the orphans, from the tortured and the oppressed, from the injured and crippled, from the prisoners and detainees, from the emigrants and displaced, from the mujahideen and the troops, from the martyrs whose spirits have scattered throughout this misbegotten world.

Greetings from a people who will follow the path of their freedom and possesses enough will to demolish the world’s greatest idol and enough love to fill the world with tranquility, warmth, and compassion.

We hate war and fighting … and we began a peaceful revolution. The regime, with its recklessness and barbarity, pushed that revolution to arms, violence and destruction.

I will speak now about our wounded but resilient people with the following points.

First: Most Syrians have ceased to care about international conferences so long as they are unable to extend even the minimum support for Syrians’ freedom. Does the affirmation of the right of self-defense require years of the open and systematic murder of the Syrian people?

Second: With our sincere thanks to all the parties that try to help us, and they are many – we nonetheless repeat that our people has paid the price of its freedom with its blood, its decisions stem from its interests, and it rejects instruction by others in its decision-making. Regional and international differences of opinion have helped complicate the problem. Our interests may coincide with some parties, but our revolution is of our own making. The Syrian people alone ignited it and will decide its course.

Third: The Arab League, with [our] thanks, has put forward a bold initiative to give Syria’s seat to the Syrian people after [the people’s] voice [lit. decision] was expropriated for half a century. This seat is part of restoring the legitimacy of which the Syrian people was deprived for so long. This surmounting of international pressure is not just an accomplishment presented to the Syrian people, rather, it shows what can happen when there is solidarity. I say that the role of the Arab nations with their neighbors in terms of mutual understanding and cooperation is a civilized, leading role, and the Arab League must restore it. In the name of the Syrian people, I thank all of our brothers for this great accomplishment.

Fourth: There are constant attempts to misrepresent the Syrian revolution, along three lines:

First, minorities. And I always say, If you want to know how the regime treats minorities, then look to our beloved brothers in Lebanon. When the Syrian regime stormed them, what did it do to them? To all the sects! Look what it did to the Kurds, to the Palestinians, and the Christians, even our brothers the Alawites! Who killed General Ghazi Kan’an, and who arrested Dr. Abdul-Aziz al-Khair? Yesterday, our Alawite brothers tore from the regime its last figleaf by declaring it renegade and savage, saying that it flouts the will of the entire Syrian people. What is happening in Syria is a struggle between slavery and freedom, between justice and injustice. And I’ll tell you about something: in the beginning of the revolution, elements linked to the regime tried to light the fuse of civil war among our brothers in Banias, in which Sunnis mix with Alawites, all of whom know that they are one people with the same rights and responsibilities. A delegation came from each, from the elders (sheikhs) of both sides and made it past the crisis, proving that the Syrian people doesn’t need the Assad mafia, that it can live together and will go on living a life with dignity and justice.

Second [of the three lines], chemical weapons. Nobody has batted an eye at what has happened to the Syrian people. There are those who have passed along timid messages, and here I’m being frank with our people, and they ask: Is it possible to destroy these weapons? And I said that is something to be decided by a comprehensive national conference that can happen, in my opinion, as part of a deal for the entire region that does away with all types of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Brothers here and governments of the world, the opposition will not sell their country.

The third of these lines is terrorism. Is terrorizing a country for two years acceptable? Can anyone seriously talk about terror when every day the Syrian people is butchered in full view of the world? They say, We aren’t against the Syrian people, only the foreign extremists. I’m not sure if it has to do with the fact that they’re foreign, or with their beards! What about the thousands of Russian and Iranian experts and Hizbullah fighters? Are they all Syrians? Let them all leave, and we’ll ask the forgiveness of our honored brothers and guests. There are many Syrian mothers – French mothers and Dutch mothers – who have sent me messages. She said, I beg you, my children left for the jihad in Syria. Do you agree with this? I said to her, Your children have a living conscience and can no longer stand the wholesale slaughter of a people! But I also say to all the young people: If your family needs you, then do not come. Serving your parents, even if they aren’t Muslim, is at the core of jihad on the path of God. They also ask who will rule Syria. Syria’s people are the ones who will decide. Not any other country – the Syrian people will decide who will govern them and how. Its sons will work out how to live together, brought together by God’s word: “There is no compulsion in religion.” As for extremist thought, it is the product of injustice and corruption. We need to treat what leads to it, and not just blame those whose conscience can no longer the daily massacres.

Fifth: The regime is the one who rejects any solution for the crisis. We welcome any political solution that spares more blood and avoids further destruction. We put forward to the regime a humanitarian initiative without a single political or military stipulation. Just release the innocent. Arrogantly, the regime said no.

Forgive if I mentioned this example, just so you know a piece of what happens in [Syria’s] prisons. There is a hotel called the Carlton. Opposite is a [security] branch, Branch 215.I ask of the officials of the Syrian regime, if they claim that they don’t know it, to go now and visit it, before the blood is washed from its floor. Some time ago, one of my students was arrested. They hung him by his hands for seven days, with intense torture. After that, he lost his mind. Because he was being tortured in a room whose floor was covered in blood and urine and that held a number of bloated corpses, and the stench was deadly. The worms boiled in those corpses, and they forced him to sleep on top of them. He went insane from the terror, but that wasn’t enough for them. They chopped him to pieces in front of the other prisoners! Is anyone in the world satisfied with that?

We asked only for the release of the detainees, and especially the women and children. Are there children? Yes, my brothers, and I can give you names. There was a child at the Ya’four checkpoint, one year old, who went for two weeks without any food or help!

We prefer a political solution in order to save more blood and destruction. The Syrian revolution has no warplanes or Scud missiles, and the regime alone is the first and last one responsible. We want freedom, not for the country to go on to more destruction. We want to proceed according to transitional justice and a national understanding and a clear political solution that prevents this regime from inflicting more savagery and devastation.

Sixth: Syrian society is a civilized one. But its sons suffer from something: that they had never before sat with each other. They discovered themselves with the revolution. They established civil administrations, police forces, courts, a judiciary, underground hospitals, schools amid the bombing!

There are many obstacles, but there is a determination to succeed. Among the accomplishments so far is the establishment of a temporary government whose president, Ghassan Hitto, was chosen and in whom we all have confidence. We in the National Coalition’s council wait for Mr. Hitto to submit a platform for debate. Just as we are now considering turning the Coalition into a comprehensive national conference.

Seventh: We ask, in the name of our oppressed people, for support in all its forms from all our brothers and friends. That includes the full right to self-defense, Syria’s seat in the United Nations and other international organizations, and the freezing of the money that the regime stole from our people, to be set aside for reconstruction.

Seventh: I thank all the governments of the world that support the Syrian people in winning its freedom, and we ask them all to meet the commitments to which they promised.

There are tens of countries that have offered assistance. An American official said to me: Are you embarrassed to say that the United States has helped you with $365 million for humanitarian aid? I said, We’re not embarrassed. And we thank all the world’s governments, but I say: The role of the United States is bigger than this! And I requested in a meeting with Mr. Kerry that a Patriot missile umbrella be extended over Syria’s North. He promised to study the issue, and we still wait for a decision from NATO to save the lives of innocents and return those displaced to their countries. Not to fight, but rather to protect people and allow them to return to their normal lives.

Tens of countries provided assistance, and I thank in particular the state of Qatar that hosted the conference, and our dear brothers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and our brothers in Jordan and Lebanon and Iraqi Kurdistan, all of whom shoulder a great burden. I offer special thanks to our brothers in Turkey and Libya, and to the unknown soldier who opened his arms unconditionally to Syrians, our brothers in Egypt. I thank our honored brothers in the Emirates, Tunisia and Morocco, and all the countries that joined us in this meeting. I thank our brothers in the Emirates, I thank our brothers in Tunisia and Morocco, and all those who supported the right of the Syrian people to their freedom. I ask all of them to ease the processing of Syrians and their residency, and to support them to the extent possible.

Eighth: Our dear brothers, forgive me if I’ve gone a little beyond the bounds of diplomatic custom. There’s something I’d like to say to you in front of all of our peoples: Omar bin Khattab was stopped by a woman in the road who said to him, Fear God, Omar. So [his companions] said to her, You say this to the Commander of the Faithful?! [Omar] said to them, Leave her. There is no good in her if she does not speak up, and no good in us if we do not listen.

I say this to you as the youngest of your brothers: Deal mercifully with your people for fear of God, and shield your countries with justice and fairness, and sow love everywhere. Our peoples long for more dignity, justice and equality, and I’m sure that if we walked among them, they would embrace us and lay their heads on our shoulders and cry for the weight of pain and trouble they bear. Our peoples are a heavy responsibility. We ask God to help you support them in your goodness.

And there is a request that reached me in hundreds of messages, even if it is outside the normal bounds of diplomacy. I ask you, if you think it appropriate, to pass a resolution in this conference – including whatever necessary to accommodate the conditions in each country, and in response to the calls of many – to release all the detainees in the Arab world, so that the Syrian revolution’s day of victory in breaking the cycle of injustice might be a day of joy for all our peoples.

From Surat al-’Asr: ‘Indeed, mankind is in loss, except for those who have believed and done righteous deeds and advised each other to truth and advised each other to patience.’

May God’s peace and mercy be upon you.

Translation Notes

Please forgive any typos in either the video or the written translation. Been racing to get this out in time to be useful.

The original video is here. I also relied on the text of the speech, posted on al-Khatib’s Facebook page here. The translation of Surat al-‘Asr has been taken from here.

Apologies for the red text – still trying to figure out how best to impose text on a mixed light and dark background.

Also, like to acknowledge my roommate, who grilled me a delicious steak while I was translating. So that was pretty clutch.

"Al-Bernameg": Amr Hamzawy on Democratic Institutions

[Update, 1 February 2021: YouTube subsequently removed this video in response to a rights claim.]

In this translated clip – taken from the March 8 episode of “Bernameg al-Bernameg” – we see Egyptian political scientist cum politician Amr Hamzawy pretty effectively sum up the liberal critique of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood-led process of institution-building.

Hamzawy’s point is a rebuttal to those, inside and outside the Brotherhood, who’ve defined democracy and democratic legitimacy principally in terms of elections – or, as host Bassem Youssef and Hamzawy put it, “the ballot box.” As we’ve seen since (at least) November 22, a forward-moving democratic transition – just like democracy in general – depends on a shared perception that the system is inherently fair. If segments of the population are convinced that the system is irreparably stacked against them, then they have little reason to play by that system’s rules.

(Also, if you’re not familiar with it: In the first section of the clip, Hamzawy and actress Basma, his wife, are clowning on Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi and this clip from the March 1 episode of “Al-Bernameg.” It’s untranslated, but you don’t really need to speak Arabic to figure out that Brotherhood Supreme Guide Muhammad al-Badi’ is feeding Morsi revolutionary buzzwords.)

Some notes:

First, apologies for putting the subtitles on top of the video. Blame Hamzawy’s white shirt.

Also, I’ve translated “القصاص” here as “justice,” but that loses a little something of the Arabic. The Arabic word, which doesn’t really have an English parallel, is close to “retribution” – a sort of justice for a wrong.

The Charter of the Syrian Islamic Front

Below is a translation of the charter of the Syrian Islamic Front, a coalition of Islamist brigades working to topple the Assad regime. (Original document here, posted January 21.)

Most immediately evident is that the Front is essentially fighting a two-front war: it’s looking to topple the Assad regime, but it’s also aiming for the establishment and reform of Islamic morals in Syria. In that sense, the Front is fighting with one eye on what will follow the collapse of regime authority.

Among (many) other noteworthy points is the Front’s envisioned place for religious minorities. Non-Muslims are nominally accorded equal rights, but those rights are strictly circumscribed by Islamic shari’a. By my reading, the status of Shi’ites and Alawites is ambiguous. The document makes clear (largely through omission) that the scope of acceptable diversity in Islamic thought and practice is limited to variations on Sunnism. As non-Sunnis perceived as heretics, then, Shi’ites and Alawites exist outside that Sunni consensus. It is unclear if they would be accorded the same baseline protections as Christians or if they would instead be dealt with more harshly.

Translation Note: The word “reform” is used throughout this document. It should be understood in the religious sense, i.e., the repair of general morals and religious belief. It should not be understood as political reform.

Charter of the Syrian Islamic Front 

Introduction:

Praise be to God; we thank Him and ask His forgiveness and guidance. Prayers and peace be upon God’s servant and messenger, our Prophet Muhammad, and on his family and companions.

To accomplish the righteous duty with which God most high has tasked us, consensus has been reached between the movements, groups, and brigades listed below in this Charter on the formation of an Islamic front to be called the “Syrian Islamic Front.” It is to undertake Islamic activity of all kinds and in all fields in Syria.

What follows is the Charter of the Front, which is considered – along with its explanatory materials and organizing regulations – the principal reference and determinant of the direction and work of the Front.

Section One: The Definition of the Front and Its Goals

[The Front is] an Islamic, reformist, comprehensive front that works to build an Islamic, civilized society in Syria ruled by the law of God, with which He graced mankind. To that end, it embraces the organizational work that brings about solidarity and coexistence among the elements of Syrian society. This includes various means, including military action, which aims to topple the regime and establish security. It also encompasses civil action, including da’wa (proselytization), educational, humanitarian, media, political, and service work.

1) The Principal Headquarters of the Front: In Syria.

2) The Goals of the Front:

• Toppling the regime and establishing security throughout beloved Syria.

• Working to empower religion on the individual, society, and state level.

• Preservation of society’s Islamic identity and the building of a comprehensive Islamic character.

• Rebuilding Syria on the sound bases of justice, independence and solidarity in accordance with the principles of Islam.

• Active participation in societal development.

• The preparation of expert leadership in all areas of life.

3) Vision:

Building a civilized Islamic society in Syria ruled by the law of God, with which He graced mankind.

4) The Message:

We are a comprehensive Islamic front working to liberate the land and people [of Syria] and to build, through organizational work, a civilized Islamic society in Syria.

Section 2: Principal Focuses

1. The reference for this Charter is based on the principles of sharia, as well as its complete rules and general aims (maqasid). No one in an Islamic society is above accountability, whoever he may be. This principle needs to be embodied in all constitutional and legal formulations, as well as in the freedom of the judiciary to enforce it.

2. Whenever we turn to principles and overarching issues, we find that dispute is rare or minimal. Whenever we turn to secondary issues or details, we find that agreement is rare or minimal. The divisions among those involved in military or civil work are principally rooted in differences in their view of reality and the means and approaches that should be used to address it, in addition to differences on the ordering of priorities. All these are difficult to resolve, and so we resort to general principle.

3. The Syrian Islamic Front is considered one of the Islamic forces at work in Syrian society, so we work to maintain the unity of our message and coalition and to avoid division. We work to reach understanding with all those working on behalf of Islam with whom it is possible to cooperate according to a common understanding of righteousness, piety, and rightly guided vision. We try to avoid antagonizing them or treating them harshly to no benefit.

4. We believe in the importance of a comprehensive review of our previous assumptions and methods insofar as it helps to avoid the repetition of mistakes and realize greater successes, both military and civil. This civil work includes da’wa and reform of morals.

5. The Front’s convictions spring from the approach of the ahl al-sunna (Sunnis), drawn from the Book of God and the confirmed sunna (actions and sayings) of the Prophet, peace be upon him. It is also based on the understanding of the righteous forefathers among the Companions and followers [of the Prophet] and respected (followed) imams.

6. The exercise of good behavior and morals and the calling of people to embrace them (da’wa) are among the authentic approaches of the righteous forefathers. We adhere to that approach in word and deed.

7. Our approach is one of centrism and moderation. It is far from religious fanaticism and its resulting deviation of creed and action. It is also far from a neglect [of religion] and the resultant weakening of the role of religion in governing public life.

8. [The Front] focuses on building correct thinking and the proper methods. It also focuses on the adoption of a gradual, controlled approach, bearing priorities in mind.

9. The Front, in its makeup and activities, springs from organizational work and adopts the principle of shura (consultation) as a means of arriving at decisions.

Section Three: The Relationship between the Members of the Front

1. The relationship is based on Islamic brotherhood and the adherence to counsel and propriety in the case of any division.

2. Priority [shall be given] to the principle of forgiveness and pardon in any dispute, as well as the mending of relations between the two parties.

3. [There shall be no] fanaticism or closed-mindedness in favor of a single view.

4. Shura is a principle in which we believe, and it is binding in decision-making that is not administrative or military. In this way, we aim to avoid the dominance of a single view.

5. The reference for all the actions of the Front is the Leadership Council (majlis al-qiyada). The Legitimate Body (al-hai’a al-shar’iya) is the legitimate governor of all the actions of the Front and its decisions are binding for the Front.

Section Four: The Relationship between the Elements of Syrian Society

Muslims:

1. The unification of Muslims in righteousness and the condemnation of division, dispute, and extremism.

2. The enlargement of the sanctity of the Muslim. The avoidance of rule over him through unbelief, wantonness, or heresy (bid’a); rather, rule only through the guidance and evidence of the ’ulama (ahl al-’ilm).

3. The recognized schools of Islamic thought (al-madhahib) among ahl al-sunna are a great intellectual wealth left to us by the umma’s (Islamic nation) scholars. We adhere to them but do not cling to them fanatically. We always work to achieve compromise between those advancing and working for Islam and to unite them in goodness, as that is considered among the best acts of worship of God most high. This is coupled with generally assuming the best of Muslims and the avoidance of snooping and hunting for mistakes and lapses.

4. Thinking the best of Muslims and overlooking their faults. Bearing their words and actions with as much forbearance as possible, coupled with advice to them.

5. Distinction in instances of da’wa between friendliness to people with the goal of lenience and reform, and between hypocrisy and silence about the truth, to say nothing of saying illegitimate things.

6. Concern with the state of Muslims throughout Syria and efforts to aid them and defend them. Administrative and financial integrity, transparency, the flow of information, the fighting of corruption, purifying society of bribery, and the protection of government jobs from personal exploitation are the basis of right-guided governance. We will work with everything at our disposal to make these principles part of public life.

7. Attention to everything that addresses the interests and needs of the people, standing with their just demands, and the rejection of any injustice that compromises their legitimate rights.

8. Women have rights like those of men, and they have responsibilities like those of men. The relationship between men and women is complementary. The crucial factor in men and women’s actions is integrity and competence, taking into consideration the legitimate particularities that distinguish women from men. This comes with affirmation of the necessity of liberation from the customs and norms that restrict the role of women in public life and that do not rely on the definitive rulings of shari’a and its general aims (maqasid). It also comes with affirmation that the West’s actions to westernize women and remove them from the framework of Islam with which God blessed them are rejected.

Non-Muslims:

1. Islam is the religion of the state, and it is the principal and only source of legislation. We will work through all legitimate and possible means to ensure that there is no law that contradicts the set and confirmed principles (al-thawabit al-mu’tamada) of Islamic shari’a.

2. The preservation of the geographic unity of Syria and the rejection of any plan to divide it on an ethnic or sectarian basis, bearing in mind that all Syrians enjoy the rights required for them by [religious] law.

3. Coexistence between the sons of one nation, however their schools [of thought] or creeds might differ. That entails mutual responsibilities and rights. It makes the principle of the sanctity of blood, money, and honor something shared by all and something upon which there can be no infringement except according to the rulings of Islamic shari’a and through [its] conclusive judicial rulings.

4. Justice and fairness are the basis of the relationship in dealing with non-Muslims. Difference of religion is not a justification for injustice against anyone.

5. All members of society can participate in realizing its general interest, however their schools [of thought] and creeds might differ.

6. The call for the integration and mixing of religions and sects is rejected according to [religious] law. Moreover, it contains a kind of aggression against those religions and communities and is a sort of religious and cultural adulteration.

Introduction to the Syrian Islamic Front:

Why the Front?

• To undertake the responsibility and carry out the charge with which God has commanded us in terms of furthering His religion and instituting His law.

• The Islamic current must have a unified voice to clearly articulate its demands and rights in order to guarantee that the just demands of the Muslim people are realized.

• The importance of an organized institutional effort to unite the brigades on the ground, develop the aid effort, and correctly place funds insofar as that accomplishes the Front’s present and future goals of building an ideal Islamic society.

• People’s need to spread the correct teachings and unerring rulings of religion, based on the Book [of God] and the sunna; their thirst for knowledge of the truth and how it can be followed, as well as righteousness and its application, especially after oppressive regimes implemented a state of intellectual terror and suffocation in the name of security that resulted in intellectual, dogmatic, and behavioral disfigurements. All this makes it imperative that there be good, upright models distinguished by their adherence to the Book [of God] and the sunna in word, deed, conviction, and labor to spread God’s message (da’wa). This is to address the sickness and correct the path.

Our Vision:

Building a civilized Islamic society in Syria that is ruled by the law of God with which He blessed us.

Our Message:

We are a comprehensive Islamic front that works to liberate [Syria’s] land and people and build a civilized Islamic society in Syria through institutional work.

Our Goals:

1. Toppling the regime and establishing security throughout beloved Syria.

2. Working to empower religion on the individual, society, and state level.

3. Preservation of society’s Islamic identity and the building of a comprehensive Islamic character.

4. Rebuilding Syria on the sound bases of justice, independence and solidarity in accordance with the principles of Islam.

5. Active participation in societal development.

6. The preparation of expert leadership in all areas of life.

Our Means:

The Front works in the following areas and along the following axes: military, political, media, intellectual, da’wa, educational and aid.

These fields are organized and joined by a number of general methods considered a shared basis for engaging them. Among these are:

1. Establishing the principle of shura through the participation of all those disposed to solutions and reason in the making of critical decisions.

2. Appealing to all Islamic brigades to join the Front and participate in decision-making and defining the future of Syria.

3. Cooperation and coordination with all forces working on the ground to topple the regime.

4. Disseminating the teachings of Islam in Syria society through da’wa and intellectual activity which the Front will undertake.

5. Putting forward programs and specialized courses in a number of areas, including: military training, Muslim personal training, training of Islamic evangelists (du’at), as well as other courses and important development programs.

6. Consultation and engagement with the Islamic institutions working according a clear, legitimate vision.

All fortune through God.

The Names of the Founding Entities of the Syrian Islamic Front

1. Ahrar al-Sham (the Free Men of Syria) Brigades (all governorates of Syria)

2. Al-Iman (Belief) Combat Brigades (Damascus governorate and the surrounding countryside)

3. Al-Hamza bin Abdul-Mutallab Brigade (Damascus governorate and the surrounding countryside)

4. Suqour al-Islam (the Hawks of Islam) Brigade (Damascus governorate and the surrounding countryside)

5. Saraya al-Maham al-Khassa (the Special Operations Brigades) (Damascus governorate and the surrounding countryside)

6. Liwa’ al-Haq (Banner of Righteousness) (Homs governorate and the surrounding countryside)

7. Harakat al-Fajar al-Islami (The Islamic Dawn Movement) (Aleppo governorate and the surrounding countryside)

8. Mus’ab bin ’Ameer Brigade (Aleppo countryside)

9. Jama’at al-Talee’a al-Islamiya (The Islamic Vanguard Group) (Idlib countryside)

10. Ansar al-Sham (Supporters of Syria) Brigades (Lattakia governorate and surrounding countryside)

11. Jeish al-Tawheed (The Army of Monotheism / Unification) (Deir al-Zour governorate and surrounding countryside)

Dodge Middle East: "Are You Dodge?"

They keep showing this ad while I’m watching episodes of 04 online.

I guess it grew on me?

(Was this an English-language ad?  It must’ve been.)

Bassem Youssef: "Why you do this?"

From the January 4 episode of “Bernameg al-Bernameg” (“The Show Show”), Bassem Youssef responds to the lawsuits filed against him:

[Update, 1 February 2021: YouTube subsequently removed this video in response to a rights claim.]

He’s obviously petrified.

Also, just to say, I’ve seen people translate the name of the show as “The Program Program,” which I suppose is technically correct.  Still, “show” and “program” are both acceptable translations for “bernameg” (برنامج), and in American idiom, we typically say “show.” (E.g., “The Daily Show.”)

In any case, I much prefer “The Show Show” as a translation.  But I guess خلّي قلبك دليلك (let your heart be your guide).

Also, I saw on this Washington Post blog that someone is apparently translating whole episodes of “Al-Bernameg.”  Whole episodes!  Seriously, what a champion.

"Just a second, Mister President.": Morsi look-alike at Alexandria demonstration

This really has no broader significance. I was just entertained.

President Morsi look-alike on Nahda stage

From the “Sada al-Balad” writeup:

Video: “Sada al-Balad” has exclusive meeting with President Morsi look-alike on Nahda stage

On the main stage, there could be found a look-alike of President Muhammad Morsi . The man, named Ramadan and hailing from Sohag governorate, began to imitate President Muhammad Morsi. In response, those present chanted, “We love you, Mr. President.”

Ramadan directed a message to the president, telling him, “Stand fast, Mr. President, God is with you.”  He asked the president to implement shari’a. He also said that he loves President Muhammad Morsi because he is devout and prays the fajr (dawn) prayer in the mosque.

This is what years of Arabic study have been building up to: translating part of this video.

(Also, the ambient noise /sound quality made it difficult to hear parts of this, so I definitely missed a few things. HT: Sarah Carr.)