War on the Rocks: “In Iraq, Restraint Is America’s Best Option” (with Maria Fantappie)

Maria Fantappie and I have a new article today at War on the Rocks, this time on the latest tit-for-tat violence between the United States and Iran-linked Iraqi paramilitaries – violence that is destructive for Iraq and, if it continues, is headed towards a strategic defeat for America:

https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/in-iraq-restraint-is-americas-best-option/

Reflexive U.S. retaliation to paramilitaries' provocations has not deterred their attacks. Far from it – the attacks have continued, and meanwhile efforts by anti-American political factions to drive the U.S. out of the country have gained new momentum.

If the United States hopes to preserve the U.S.-Iraqi bilateral relationship and remain in Iraq to help combat the country's Islamic State insurgency, it has to break this retaliatory cycle. But it can't do that by counter-escalating against paramilitary factions – instead, its best option is exercising restraint. That could create conditions for the formation of an Iraqi government with which Washington can partner and re-solidify the legitimate basis for its involvement in the country.

The seeming alternative is more deadly violence to no good end – more Iraqi lives lost and, ultimately, the U.S. out of Iraq entirely, in a major win for Iran and its Iraqi allies.

Islamic State: Substantial, continuous "returns"

Below is another translation from issue 192 of the Islamic State’s weekly newsletter al-Naba, this time the latest in a series of columns on operational guidance titled “Take Care.”

This seems notable in terms of how it presents a sort of Unified Theory of operations, conceptualizing Islamic State units’ modal shift from high-volume rudimentary violence to more sophisticated attacks, to in-between hybrid approaches, depending on that unit’s capability and circumstance. The column adopts the figurative language of “returns,” in discussing how best to balance and diversify an Islamic State detachment’s portfolio of violence. The thinking here seems to apply to ground-level insurgency as much as to external operations globally.

It’s unknown to what extent this sort of thinking is communicated through the Islamic State’s ranks globally, or guides the organization’s day-to-day operations. What we can say, though, is that elements in Islamic State’s central apparatus have evidently put some thought into when and how the group steps up and down its operational ladder, and they want to communicate that thought to al-Naba‘s Islamic State readership.

Translation follows:

Take Care 8: Planning for Action and the Constraints of Reality

Al-Naba, no. 192, 25 July 2019

For the mujahideen, the subject of target selection depends on a number of issues. They include those related to [the mujahideen], such as the importance of the target to them and the possibility of executing against it; and those related to the enemy, such as the importance of the target to him, and the extend of the damage to him through targeting it.

On this basis, the mujahideen are often faced with numerous options when devising the battle plan on which they will depend to exhaust their enemy before eventually destroying him, with the permission of God Almighty.

The most important of these options:

First: Concentrating on operations that are small-scale, numerous and widespread, abandoning large-scale operations given their difficulty in execution and their costs.

Second: Concentrating on operations that are large-scale, few and focused in terms of their target, and neglecting small operations given their limited return and weak impact.

Between these two opposing options, we find middle options, the most important of which are:

Third: Concentrating on continuous small operations, while constantly searching for important targets to strike when possible.

Fourth: Concentrating on large targets, even if they are few, without leaving any opportunity to strike the enemy with small operations.

Fifth: Working without focus, in order to strike the enemy wherever possible, with small or large operations.

Work at the Outset

Generally, we can say that the mujahideen’s choice of any of these options is subject to internal conditions related to the situation of the mujahideen, in terms of organization, means and targets; and external conditions, related to the situation of their enemy, in terms of his strength and empowerment.

So when the mujahid detachment is small in size, weak in means and primitive in terms of its members’ ability to plan and execute, with the goal of continuing and developing its work until destroying the enemy entirely and realizing tamkin (empowerment) on the ground; and when its enemy is strong and empowered on the ground, then it will be in [the detachment’s] interest to begin its work by pursuing the first option.

If the goal of the detachment is limited to producing the maximum damage to the enemy, and the enemy is strong and empowered, such that the mujahideen assume they will not be able to continue executing attacks for long, then it is best for them to pursue the second option.

This is what we see typically in the operations of mujahideen detachments or their members working in Crusader countries. They take into account the difficulty of withdrawing from the site of the attack after executing, or the difficulty of continuing to execute consecutive attacks given their exposure to the enemy, and so they operating according to this option in line with the means available, most importantly the weapons required and [their] ability to deliver them to the site of the attack. Thus, we see them vary between using knives, in attacks that leave few dead and wounded in the Crusaders’ ranks, with a limited psychological and propaganda impact; and large, coordinated attacks using explosives and firearms, which leave major losses – material and human – in the Crusaders’ ranks, and have a major media echo.

If the detachment is strong – in that its members possess the expertise necessary to carry out large operations, even if it is weak in numbers and means – then it can also follow the second option, in order to achieve swift growth for itself, as large operations draw the eyes and hearts of local supporters faster. This is what the Islamic State did when it first entered Syria, as it was limited at the start to a few expert brothers with a small number of local supporters with limited expertise. Thus, work started with large attacks concentrated on the key junctures of the Nuseiri [derog., Alawite] regime, which help earn notoriety for the detachment, ‘Jabhat al-Nusrah,’ and encourage tens, then hundreds of muhajireen and ansar [foreign fighters and locals] to join it, especially after they learned it answered to the Islamic State.

Similarly, Sheikh Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and his brothers followed this option at the start of their fight against the invading Crusader forces in Iraq. These larger operations that the mujahideen executed against the United Nations and the Crusaders’ embassies and barracks helped earn them widespread notoriety, which overshadowed that of all the factions present in that arena. That encouraged the muhajireen and ansar to join Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, especially after it became clear to them that its creed was based on monotheism and its program was based on jihad on the path of God until the establishment of religion and the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate.

Work in Advanced Stages 

After the detachment grows, in quantity and quality – such that it becomes reasonably numerous, making it difficult to eliminate it totally, and likewise its material means and its members’ technical capabilities grow, in terms of expertise at planning and executing attacks – then it is harmful for the group to limit itself to one of these two options (the first and second). Limiting itself to the first means letting slip these larger attacks with a major impact on the enemy, despite its ability to execute them; and limiting itself to the second leads to freezing a major part of its members and means, as it is not possible to mobilize all of that to execute major operations, which are typically few in number, thus afflicting the detachment with inactivity.

Thus, it is better for [the detachment] to transition to one of the middle options (the third or fourth), by dividing the detachment into two sections:

The first [section] relies on quantity, including mujahideen with limited expertise, spread widely, who can carry out [attacks] in quantitatively large numbers and over a wide geographic range. That leads, in aggregate, to achieving a major return through the sum total of their attacks, not with some of them individually. They are akin to vendors at intersections, who sell small quantities of goods that realize a relatively small return for them, but – if we combine all their returns – add up to a substantial aggregate return.

The second [section] relies on quality, including mujahideen with expertise, capable of planning, managing and executing major attacks that bring a substantial, raised return to the mujahideen, and large losses for their enemies. They are akin to wholesalers, who realize a large return from each deal, one that might equal or exceed the gain of hundreds of sales conducted by their clients over the long term.

By combining the two options, it is possible to employ a major part of the detachment in a plan of action that prevents inactivity, and achieves returns that are continuous over time and large in terms of aggregate operations, distributed over the work’s spread and expanse, and that help capacitate and train the mujahideen to fight and acquire substantial working expertise. At the same time, [these operations] permit major quantitative and qualitative leaps in the course of the jihad, by achieving substantial damage and losses for the enemy in material, human, psychological and media terms; and major returns for the mujahideen, in terms of material spoils and attracting new mujahideen for recruitment and work within the detachment.

As for the fifth option, the mujahid detachment typically follows it in instances of a weak apparatus of command, control and communications, such that the detachment’s command orders its members to work according to what is possible; or in emergency cases, in which the mujahideen find themselves forced to strike the enemy with everything available in order to preoccupy him so as not to resist some important action by the mujahideen, or to scramble his offensive or defense movements against them; or just to strike his stability at a particular time. Thus, the detachment’s command orders its members to work to the utmost extent, without consideration for any constraints to divide the work, or plan over the long term.

We notice that the Islamic State’s policy towards operations in Crusader countries oscillates between the third and fifth options. Indeed, it called on Muslims there to attack what targets they could strike, with what weapons were available, to achieve the greatest possible losses in the Crusaders’ ranks. That was in light of the difficulty of controlling and directing the mujahideen’s operations there, and the danger of communicating with them about this. Thus, they were expected to execute small, continuous operations, with the possibility that some of them might be able to carry out large operations.

At the same time, though, when [the Islamic State] has sent trained detachments prepared to execute attacks, it has pushed these detachments to execute major attacks in terms of their targets, the way of executing the attacks against them, and the losses expected from striking them.

[The Islamic State] has thus achieved continuous returns from the attacks of lone mujahideen and detachments that are small in size, limited in expertise, and weak in preparation. Even though the returns of each of their attacks have been relatively limited, they have nonetheless, in aggregate, been large, approaching the substantial returns of the qualitative operations that the Islamic State’s soldiers have carried out in the past few years.

Despite all that, we know that it is beneficial for the mujahideen to liberate themselves from the constraints with which they can restrict their work sometimes, and to build their plans on the basis of their [local] reality, their means and their targets, and on the reality of their enemy and his means and targets, as well as for them to rely on God Almighty in executing what they have set their minds on, for what a blessed Patron and Helper He is.

Islamic State: "In the eyes of his enemies an army of heroes..."

Below is a translation of the editorial from issue 192 of the Islamic State’s weekly newsletter al-Naba. The editorial – which is presumably aimed at the Islamic State’s core supporters, including militants active in the field – takes a derisive tone on Iraqi security forces’ pursuit of Islamic State fighters, and emphasizes the futility and emptiness of their efforts. Per the editorial, Iraqi forces’ energetic operations are driven by their fear of once more ceding the country’s countryside to the insurgent group, allowing it to reorganize and penetrate Iraq’s cities. Islamic State militants must therefore cultivate that fear and recall the divine reward awaiting them, even as they now live as fugitives.

Set aside the editorial’s posturing: It’s worth noting the editorial seemingly indicates an understanding of the complementary logics of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Its authors describe, correctly, why Iraqi forces and their international partners are working to keep up pressure on Islamic State insurgents with operations like “Will of Victory,” thus preventing the group’s small units from coalescing and organizing more dangerous attacks.

The editorial is also an apparent acknowledgement that, for the Islamic State’s insurgents in Iraq, times are hard, albeit spiritually rewarding. It seems to admit that Islamic State militants are ragged and hungry, even if their enemies think they’re “an army of heroes on the verge of storming cities anew.” For the Islamic State, stoking fears of its resurgence (for example) is evidently a deliberate strategic choice, even as the group’s ambitions, for now, may not rise far beyond continued insurgent survival.

Translation follows:

Indeed, God does not waste the reward of the good

Al-Naba, no. 192, 25 July 2019

Before the conquest of Mosul, Iraq’s Rafidhah [derog., Shi’a] would persistently muster thousands from their army and police to march in the Anbar desert and Badiyat al-Jazirah searching for the Islamic State’s camps and its soldiers’ hiding places. These columns were huge, sometimes reaching hundreds of armored vehicles. They move like parades, while, really, all their soldiers hoped for was not to happen on any mujahid whom they might be forced to engage. These campaigns would usually end with a photo of their commanders at the bottom of a ravine or near the wreckage of a village, which let them claim that the remains indicated the Islamic State’s soldiers had passed by that day.

Typically the rapture of those empty parades would come to an end with a calamity befalling the apostates, far from the locales of their supposed victories, as the mujahideen’s security detachments surprised them with powerful blows in the most fortified areas inside Baghdad, Mosul, Samarra, Kirkuk and Baqouba. They would awake once more from their beautiful dreams to horrible nightmares that would bring down their security and military commanders, force them to reorder their forces and reorganize their formations, then take off once more into the desert towards some new dream of a conclusive victory over the Islamic State.

Someone considering these campaigns, which the Rawafidh [derog., Shi’a] have repeated today at an even greater pace and scale, will find they are a ruse by the incapable and the choice of someone with no other option. The alternative is for them to sit in their bases and barracks waiting for shells and missiles to fall on them, or for [explosive] charges and ambushes to cut their roads. At the same time, these campaigns represent for them one form of the control on the ground they are working to preserve, as, by halting [these campaigns], these areas in which the Islamic State’s soldiers move today would become effectively fallen militarily. The apostates would become encircled in the urban areas they are attempting to secure, which would turn little by little into fortresses, for fear that the Islamic State might storm them once more. Likewise, what the Rawafidh and their Crusader allies fear most today is that the mujahideen now spread out shift from the mode of small bands carrying out military attacks with limited force to the mode of semi-conventional formations that can – with the permission of God Almighty – carry out coordinated, medium-size or even large operations, in terms of their range and the nature of their targets. Through these ongoing campaigns, therefore, they are attempting to keep the mujahideen in a state of constant movement and dispersal, by continuously pursuing them and preventing them from establishing long-term settlements by searching for and destroying [those positions]; in that way, they pressure [the mujahideen] to prevent them from receiving large numbers of nafirin [incoming, newly mobilised fighters], especially in areas of operation surrounding cities and main roads. And so we find that no sooner do the Rawafidh today hear of a tent pitched in the desert than they move columns to it to confirm that those sheltering in it are not among the Caliphate’s soldiers. No sooner does a spy tell them that he saw some people in a remote, mountainous area than they launch a sweeping campaign on it, for fear that [those people] might be among the Islamic State’s mujahideen. This terror is not the exclusive to the Rawafidh in Iraq, rather – praise to God Almighty – it pervades the souls of infidels and apostates everywhere. Since the announcement of the Caliphate, they have been in a state of constant alert, one that their supposed announcements of final victory over the Islamic State have not ended, for they know, before others, that [these announcements] are nothing but vain lies.

And so, the Islamic State’s mujahideen ought to rejoice at this great blessing from their Lord Almighty, that He has made the continued existence of their raised banner a source of wrath and fear and panic, and a reason for the infidels’ attrition, exhaustion and constant movement. What they instill in the hearts of God’s enemies is all jihad on the path of God Almighty, for which they will be rewarded with good deeds through which their belief will grow and which will disavow their ill deeds and elevate their [divine] status. Perhaps they pay this no mind, given the height of their morale and their aspiration to what is higher and greater than these deeds, and more damaging and deadlier to the enemies of God, Lord of Worlds. How could they, when added to that is hunger, fear, concern and sorrow they encounter, even as they hold fast to their religion, gripping their monotheism. As God Almighty said: “It was not becoming for the people of Medinah and those Bedouins around it not to follow God’s Messenger, nor to prefer their own souls over his. For they are not afflicted by thirst, fatigue or hunger on the path on God, nor do they tread a path that enrages the infidels, nor do they gain at the enemy’s expense, but that a righteous deed is recorded for them. Indeed, God does not waste the reward of the good. They do not spend anything, small or large, nor cross a valley, but that it is recorded for them that God might reward them with the best of what they have done (9:120, 9:121).”

[The mujahideen] must be confident that they are, with God’s permission, made victorious by their Lord with terror and with what He wishes from His soldiers. For many a mujahid grown weak, with little aid, unable to afford ammunition, with the Crusaders’ planes hovering overhead and surrounded by masses of apostates, may be in his own eyes put-upon, a fugitive; but in the eyes of his enemies an army of heroes on the verge of storming cities anew, their spirits broken before him, unable to hold fast in the face of his fierce, terrifying advance. So let [the mujahideen] work to further frighten their enemies, and to terrify them more, and let them endure what they encounter on the path of God Almighty. For what is all their work but worship, and what is its fruit but the best [reward] and more. For their Lord Almighty said: “And say, ‘Act! For God will see your work, as will his Prophet and the believers. And you will be returned to the Knower of the Unseen and the Seen, and He will inform you of what you used to do (9:105).”

War on the Rocks: “A Glimpse into the Islamic State’s External Operations, Post-Caliphate”

Today at War on the Rocks, I have a new article on the self-proclaimed Islamic State's ability to carry out international terror attacks, even after the loss of its territorial "caliphate":

https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/a-glimpse-into-the-islamic-states-external-operations-post-caliphate/

One of the main objectives of the U.S.-led military campaign against the Islamic State’s “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria was to deny the group a base to plot “external operations.” Weeks after the group lost its last territorial foothold in Syria, however, it claimed its deadliest-ever international terrorist attack, in Sri Lanka. So what global threat does a post-"caliphate" Islamic State still pose?

I've written about a presentation late last year by Lebanon's then Interior Minister, in which he laid out, in exceptional detail, a series of attempts by the Islamic State to plot terror attacks in Lebanon. Crucially, the Islamic State handlers managing the attacks were based in Syria's Idlib province – so, outside the group's defined, bounded territory, in areas it didn't control outright.

The Interior Minister's presentation provides a unique insight into how the Islamic State can plot external operations, even without territorial control. Yet it can also help demystify these attacks. Post-"caliphate," the group is likely even more motivated to use global terror to pose as an international bogeyman – but using this presentation, we can describe something intended to be terrifying and inexplicable in real, concrete terms…

Valdai Club: “Idlib: Maintaining the Sochi Deal Is By No Means an Ideal Solution, but for Now It Is the Best One on Offer”

Now up at Valdai Club, I have a companion piece to Crisis Group's latest Idlib report:

http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/idlib-maintaining-the-sochi-deal-is-by-no-means/

For anyone who might have been intimidated by the report's length, this is a more bite-sized version of its key points and its policy argument. It's also a little more Russia-centered, given both the outlet and Moscow's centrality to any solution. Idlib presents no attractive, easy policy choices. Still, there are good reasons for Russia to avoid a wide-open battle for Idlib, and instead double down on the Sochi agreement and its partnership with Turkey.

“سيناريوهات”: “ما مصير "داعش" بعد احتدام المعارك بآخر معاقله؟”

مشاركتي في برنامج “سيناريوهات” على قناة الجزيرة، حول وضع تنظيم “داعش” بعد سقوط آخر معاقله في سوريا:

Interview: Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations: “The Complex Phenomenon of Religious Extremism”

My interview with Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations about Salafi-jihadist militancy, sectarianism, and discriminating counterterrorism policy:

https://www.scfr.ir/en/scienceculture/101797/the-complex-phenomenon-of-religious-extremism/

International Crisis Group: “Rightsizing the Transnational Jihadist Threat”

Out today, I have a new Crisis Group commentary pushing back on some eye-popping numerical estimates of Salafi-jihadists worldwide that are alarmist and unhelpful:

https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/rightsizing-transnational-jihadist-threat

"Salafi-jihadism" is a specific thing that poses a specific threat. Playing fast and loose with definitions and lumping in large numbers of non-jihadist militants can only muddle policy thinking. What's more, the Salafi-jihadist movement has evolved dramatically in recent years. So yes, the number of actual jihadists in 2018 is much greater than in 2001 – but these fighters are also qualitatively different, and much more locally oriented. One-to-one comparisons over time don't make sense.

Smart counterterrorism policy will require focus and analytical precision. Big, dubious numbers, on the other hand, are attention-grabbing but not constructive.

War on the Rocks, “‘Frogs’ and ‘Geckos’: Syria’s Jihadists Speak the Language of Rebellion”

At War on the Rocks today, I have a new article about the dual local/transnational character of Syrian jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham:

https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/frogs-and-geckos-syrias-jihadists-speak-the-language-of-rebellion/

The jumping-off point for the article is a sort of exceptional video from Tahrir al-Sham, a seemingly unscripted roundtable discussion among three of its top leaders about “reconciliation” (Damascus-style). Their conversation is an insight not only into their substantive positions, but also how they categorize and make sense of the Syrian war around them, as they repeatedly translate between their own religious-jurisprudential lexicon and Syria’s buzzwords, hashtags and slang. In turn, their fluency in both of these registers – jihadist and Syrian opposition – highlights the challenge of isolating them from their Syrian opposition context, something they themselves clearly recognize is a mortal threat to them and to their project.

Tahrir al-Sham's Abu al-Yaqadhan al-Masri: "The coming days are pregnant with surprises."

Below is a 17 September Telegram post from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham shar’i Abu al-Yaqadhan al-Masri, one of a number of Tahrir al-Sham officials/media personalities who have reacted unfavorably to the announcement of a new Turkish-Russian deal for Syria’s Idlib. province.

Addressing the press after bilateral talks Monday, Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin announced a memorandum of understanding meant to stabilize the Idlib “de-escalation zone.” Critically, the memorandum stipulates the creation of a de-militarized buffer zone along northwest Syria’s rebel-government line of contact, to be jointly policed by Russia and Turkey. Rebels’ heavy weaponry will be removed from the zone, which is also to be cleared of (per Putin) “Jabhat al-Nusrah” (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham).

Like other Tahrir al-Sham figures, Abu al-Yaqadhan is not amicable to disarmament; he and his comrades portray their weapons as integrally to their dignity and continued jihad. Abu al-Yaqadhan may be particularly hardcore, among Tahrir al-Sham’s public-facing figures. He previously stirred controversy by apparently licensing Tahrir al-Sham fighters to shoot uncooperative rebel rivals in the head and take a relaxed approach to civilian collateral damage. But he is by no means alone among Tahrir al-Sham personalities who have voiced hostility to the Sochi agreement. Whether their snap reactions represent Tahrir al-Sham’s collective position remains to be seen. The initial response to the Sochi deal from the group’s official media outlet has been negative.

Abu al-Yaqadhan’s Telegram post:

Sham the Revealer

For the continuation of the jihad and the rule of shari’ah, the way forward is striking necks.

Whoever asks you to surrender your weapon, he deserves most to be fought, ahead of others.

Whoever retreats from his slogans of ‘continuing the fight until the regime is toppled’ and surrenders his weapon, he is a hypocrite #frog*.

Whoever manufactures problems to eliminate the mujahid factions to advance the Sochi agreement, he is a traitor [intelligence] agent.

The coming days are pregnant with surprises, so prepare for epic battles.

* Note: “Frog” (difda’) is a Syrian opposition neologism for someone who flips to join the government loyalist camp, after Kafrbatna (East Ghouta) sheikh Bassam al-Difda’, a particularly well-publicized recent example.

Source: Abu al-Yaqadhan al-Masri, Telegram

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's Abu Ikrimah al-Urduni on Idlib protests: "Brothers, a very important issue..."

Below are translations of two voice recordings purported to be of Tahrir al-Sham emir “Abu Ikrimah al-Urduni,” via anti-Jabhat al-Nusrah/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group “JAN Violations.” The voice messages are notable for their apparently acute sensitivity to the optics of Idlib’s protests and those protests’ portrayal in foreign media, which Abu Ikrimah sees as directly linked to action against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Abu Ikrimah coaches his Tahrir al-Sham audience on flexibility and subtlety in dealing with protesters in order to avoid embarrassing anti-Tahrir al-Sham scenes.

Idlib is primed today for another Friday of protests against a Syrian military offensive on the province. But Tahrir al-Sham seemingly recognizes that those protests can be turned against it, either spontaneously or by outside hands.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emir Abu Ikrimah al-Urduni, voice message 1: “Brothers, a very important issue: We don’t want it to be come out in the Western media that the people opposes us, and that the people brought down our banner and stomped on it. Pay attention: If the banner is raised, there will be people placed just to pull away the banner and stomp on it. And it will appear in the Western media that they stomped on the Hayah’s banner. This is a big issue, brothers. It means that the battle will be against us, in the future. They’ll say that the people is ready now to announce the battle in these protests. Because these protests are what, the people, the public. If the people and the public pull away our banner in front of the media and stomp on it, that means the battle is ready against us now.”

Abu Ikrimah al-Urduni, voice message 2: “Peace and God’s blessings be upon you, something very important to say: Coordinate with those responsible for these protests and say to them, ‘We’re with you, your brothers, and whatever you need, we’ll walk with you. And for your protection.’ Talking is free, brothers. Why not speak to them kindly. They’ll say, ‘God reward you, we don’t need anything.’ Tell them, ‘Okay, we’ll walk with you. We’re Muslims, too, and we demand the toppling of the regime.’”

Original tweet/audio:

هذا ماقاله المدعو أبو عكرمة الأردني أحد أمراء هيئة تحرير الشام
فما رأيك؟!#JNV pic.twitter.com/BQSt7gIOD0

— انتهاكات جبهة النصرة (@JAN_Violations) September 13, 2018

The Atlantic: “Russia Can Stop a Slaughter in Idlib”

My piece for The Atlantic about Syria's Idlib province and the reasons to forestall a deadly Syrian military offensive:

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/idlib-syria-russia-turkey/569590/

War on the Rocks: “As Assad Turns to Syria’s Southwest, Washington Faces a Choice”

Out today, I have a new piece for War on the Rocks that’s a companion to our Crisis Group report on Syria’s southwestern de-escalation. At War on the Rocks, I focus on the United States’ role in the de-escalation agreement and how U.S. policy on Syria broadly has frequently undercut the deal – but why the southwest still matters and deserves an urgent U.S. response:

https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/as-assad-turns-to-syrias-southwest-washington-faces-a-choice/

Southwestern Syria is vital to the security of two of America’s closest regional allies, Israel and Jordan. The southwest merits U.S. attention and effort, on the area’s own terms.

A wide-open Syrian military offensive on the south would be disastrous for its Syrian residents, first and foremost, but also dangerous and worse for America’s regional allies. There may still be time for a negotiated alternative that spares needless bloodshed, prevents the south’s communities and social fabric from being further shredded, and helps safeguard U.S. allies. But on their own, Jordan and Israel likely can’t broker much more than “de-confliction” of an offensive – if there’s going to be a better deal, America needs to act.

Valdai Club: “Syria: Humanitarian Corridors”

My piece for the Valdai Club:

https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/russia-should-go-beyond-humanitarian-corridors-syria

Russia has proposed "humanitarian corridors" to evacuate Damascus's East Ghouta suburbs and the area around the Tanaf base. Those corridors are unlikely to accomplish humanitarian ends because – realistically, in both areas – civilians can't count on safety on the other side. Yet Ghouta and Tanaf both present opportunities for Russia to play a role that is stabilizing and life-saving, if only it can bring its Syrian partner on-side.

The Century Foundation: “Managing Syrian Conflict May Be Possible. Resolving It Isn’t” (with Thanassis Cambanis)

In this last piece for The Century Foundation, my TCF colleague Thanassis Cambanis and I debate reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and the trajectory of Western Syria policy broadly:

https://tcf.org/content/report/managing-syrian-conflict-may-possible-resolving-isnt/

This was a fun one to do, and it reflects the sort of (friendly) argument we'd have within the TCF Foreign Policy team.

Sina'at al-Fikr: "The mujahideen at this stage shouldn’t defend according to the principle, 'Until the last man, and the last bullet.'"

Below is how I think Hayat Tahrir al-Sham may now be fighting the Syrian regime’s forces, as the latter push deeper into rebel-held Idlib. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham seems not to be mounting a valiant, heels-dug-in last stand, but rather a fighting, attritive retreat paired with asymmetric insurgent tactics.

The text I’ve translated is a set of posts from a Telegram account called “Sina’at al-Fikr” (Producing Thought), which, per one description, is a channel for “programmatic guidance in order to produce right-minded consciousness.” In practice, it seems to function as a Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-aligned outlet that offers short pieces of ideological and strategic advice and instruction, like a sort of jihadist think tank publishing in bite-sized installments. (There are several Sina’at al-Fikr accounts currently on Telegram. The one that is currently active and being referred to by other accounts describes itself as a reserve account.)

These posts were originally from May 2017, but they’ve recently been published again, both by the current Sina’at al-Fikr account on 17 January 2018 and by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham media official Muhammad Nazzal (Abu Khattab al-Maqdisi) on 17 and 23 January 2018. They come in the wake of Tahrir al-Sham’s loss of the eastern Idlib countryside – including the Abu al-Dhuhour airbase – and amid complaints from other opposition constituencies about Tahrir al-Sham’s successive retreats ahead of the regime’s ongoing offensive.

If the thinking outlined below is what’s behind Tahrir al-Sham’s repeated withdrawals and its judicious use of manpower and resources in defense of insurgent-held territory, I think it’s probably the smart move for the group. As Tahrir al-Sham itself apparently recognizes, it can’t prevail in open battle with the regime and its allies, particularly against Russian airpower.

But the smart strategic move for Tahrir al-Sham – which is probably better equipped than other factions to resort to a rural insurgency – is not good for Idlib’s other, locally grounded rebel factions, or for civilians.

When Sina’at al-Fikr tells “the mujahideen” they shouldn’t aim “to prevent the enemy from reaching the areas he wants” – those “areas he wants” are cities like Saraqib and the provincial capital Idlib, where civilian Idlibis live. Realistically, there’s probably no way to defend these areas. But Tahrir al-Sham’s strategic shift means these cities and towns’ civilian residents will need to run, or otherwise fend for themselves.

Translation follows. (Note: The repeated ellipses are in the original Arabic.)

Sina’at al-Fikr, 17 May 2017:

“The most important tactics the mujahideen need to adopt at this stage of the Syrian jihad:

“In the event the regime launches military campaigns, then generally any defense ought not be meant to prevent the enemy from reaching the areas he wants… But, instead, to make his arrival there extremely costly… And attritive in the full meaning of the word.

“That is because the enemy still enjoys a military strength that enables him to reach any point he wants… So, the mujahideen at this stage shouldn’t defend according to the principle, ‘Until the last man, and the last bullet,’ rather according to the principle, ‘The greatest loss for the enemy.’ Let [the mujahideen] raise, to the maximum extent, the price the enemy pays… In terms of the lives of his soldiers and his military material… In order to reach the point he wants.

“That’s in the first defensive stage… Then let [the mujahideen] raise, to the maximum extent, the price the enemy pays to remain in that area he sought after…

“This is the tactic to which we need to be attentive:
– Booby-trapping and rigging before retreating, which makes the enemy lose dearly before taking any military point.
– Sniping and flanking maneuvers, which mean heavy losses for the enemy when he’s charging in.
– Inghimasi [suicide commando] groups that assault the enemy continuously while he mans his positions.

“Offensive tactics at this stage:

“They need to be premised on implementation with precision, speed, and discipline to avoid aerial efforts… Which may, when they’re present, result in serious losses in the ranks of the mujahideen.”

War on the Rocks: "America in Search of an Un-Geneva for Syria"

For War on the Rocks, I’ve written a companion piece to my recent Century Foundation commentary on America’s re-investment in Syria’s Geneva talks. In this latest, I try to answer: If Geneva won’t secure U.S. interests in Syria, what will?

“America in Search of an Un-Geneva for Syria”

I argue America shouldn’t count on Geneva, or on any national-level processes – negotiations over the whole of Syria or control of Syria’s center in Damascus – that have been thoroughly colonized by Russia.

Instead, the United States should invest in subnational processes focusing on Syria’s southwest and northeast. It’s at this level where America has more useful influence relative to Russia, and where there might be a genuine intersection of U.S. and Russian interests.

Perspectives on Terrorism: "The Strategic Logic of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham"

New paper from me, for a special al-Qaeda-focused issue of Perspectives on Terrorism:

“The Strategic Logic of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham”

For this issue, I wrote on the strategic thinking behind the 2017 establishment of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the latest iteration of former Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrah. To frame that logic, I relied on the work of political scientist Peter Krause and his “Movement Structure Theory.” Krause’s theory is useful in describing the dynamics of northwest Syria’s insurgency and the rationale for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s project of intra-insurgent hegemony, as the group itself articulated it. The paper hopefully sheds light on Tahrir al-Sham’s priorities and prospects, as well as avenues for building on Krause’s work.

This paper was originally prepared for a September conference in Oslo organized by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), in cooperation with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the full issue of Perspectives on Terrorism, including other papers by a fairly heavy-duty assortment of researchers, see: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot

The Century Foundation: "Syrian Humanitarian 'Lifeline' Goes to Vote"

Today at The Century Foundation, I have a new report on the stakes of Tuesday’s expected vote to renew UN Security Council Resolution 2165 – the international legal mandate for Syria’s cross-border humanitarian response.

“Syrian Humanitarian ‘Lifeline’ Goes to Vote”

For months, humanitarians and donors have been anxious over the renewal of UNSCR 2165. On Tuesday, December 19, the Security Council is expected to finally vote on what a top UN relief official has called a “lifeline” for Syrians in need.

Most of the Security Council backs renewal of UNSCR 2165, which they argue is purely humanitarian. But the resolution also has clear political implications, insofar as cross-border aid without the permission of Syria’s Assad regime has been a potent symbol of Syria’s broken sovereignty.

And only one vote really matters: Russia’s. Russia has said UNSCR 2165 was an emergency response to conditions that no longer exist and that the resolution should be phased out. No one really knows whether Russia will ultimately opt for renewal, or what concessions it wants in exchange.

Of the more than a dozen humanitarians and donor-country diplomats who spoke to me ahead of the vote, most thought the resolution would be renewed – this time.

But even though a renewal will save lives, it’s also only a temporary reprieve. As the Assad regime returns from the brink, an international system premised on state sovereignty is likewise reasserting itself. In that normal international order, it’s tough to imagine a place for something exceptional like UNSCR 2165 – and without that exception, there’s no good alternative means to help millions of Syrians.

The Century Foundation: "Geneva Talks Will Not Salvage U.S. Syria Policy"

At The Century Foundation, I’ve written about America’s reinvestment in Geneva peace talks and how – as I understand it – Russia is simultaneously managing Geneva and its own set of parallel processes.

“Geneva Talks Will Not Salvage U.S. Syria Policy”

Washington is now counting on Geneva to tie together the disparate strings of U.S. policy in Syria. It’s not going to work. Geneva is structurally broken, and no amount of American enthusiasm will fix that.

Geneva won’t make U.S. Syria policy make sense, and it won’t lead to a political settlement Washington actually likes. If these talks produce anything at all, that thing will be made to Russian specifications. So America needs to ask itself – is that what it wants?