Century International: “Adopt a Ministry: How Foreign Aid Threatens Lebanon’s Institutions”

I have a new report out for Century International, on how international donor support is keeping Lebanon's public institutions and services running:

https://tcf.org/content/report/adopt-a-ministry-how-foreign-aid-threatens-lebanons-institutions/

Lebanon's economic crisis has brought the Lebanese state to the brink of collapse. International donors have stepped in to sponsor many of the country's public institutions and essential services, even going so far as to pay partial salaries for teachers and soldiers. It's the type of assistance normally reserved for countries devastated by war, donor country representatives told me.

It's not clear all this aid is particularly considered or wise, and it risks various perverse effects for Lebanon and its long-term development. This report lays out donors' most significant aid interventions in Lebanon and the debates and controversies over that support. The aim is to, hopefully, jump-start a debate over foreign donor assistance to Lebanon and where the country is heading.

We've also put out a shorter, more digestible Century commentary highlighting some of the report's most important points:

In English: https://tcf.org/content/commentary/international-aid-keeps-lebanon-afloat-it-could-also-be-destroying-its-institutions/

And Arabic: https://tcf.org/content/commentary/international-aid-keeps-lebanon-afloat-it-could-also-be-destroying-its-institutions/ar/

Foreign Affairs: “The Upsides of Syrian Normalization”

Another new article from me, this time a piece for Foreign Affairs on why Arab normalization with Assad's Syria is basically fine – potentially even good: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/syria/upsides-syrian-normalization-assad

In May, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad made his triumphant return to the Arab League, after a decade-long absence. People were, understandably, distressed at his rehabilitation.

Really, though, I think that angst is misplaced. This was bound to happen, sooner or later. And in practical terms, the actual downsides of Arab normalization with Damascus are limited. (Many of the risks that opponents of normalization have warned about relate more to Syrian-Turkish normalization, which is something more genuinely dangerous.) And the potential upsides of Arab normalization are substantial, both for the countries presently engaging Damascus and for ordinary Syrians. Now these Arab countries have committed with Damascus, at least on paper, to a set of joint political, security and humanitarian steps that could improve living conditions for Syrians stuck in a destroyed country.

For Washington and its Western allies, it doesn't make sense to try to stop this, or even reverse it. Normalization is inevitable. Better, instead, to work with their Arab partners now dealing with Damascus to make sure ordinary Syrians get something out of all this.

The New Humanitarian: “What lessons can be drawn from the international earthquake response in Syria?”

Today at The New Humanitarian, I have an article on why international aid was so slow to reach Syria's northwest after February's devastating earthquakes: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2023/08/14/what-lessons-can-be-drawn-international-earthquake-response-syria

It's been six months since a pair of deadly earthquakes hit southern Turkey and northwest Syria. After the quakes, it took days for international assistance to reach Syria's opposition-held northwest from Turkey – in that critical window of time, Syrians died. People are still debating why.

Much of the criticism has focused on the UN's supposed failures in responding to the disaster. But northwest Syria seems to have suffered largely because of its in-between, non-state status. The UN-led cross-border aid response in northwest Syria relied on a complex logistical operation in southern Turkey that proved acutely vulnerable to this type of disaster. And northwest Syria's de facto governing authorities, for their part, weren't able to avail themselves of international emergency response systems built for use by states. Foreign governments proved unwilling to send search-and-rescue teams into areas controlled by non-state armed groups, where those governments had no existing relationships and interlocutors.

The aftermath of February's earthquakes challenges the international emergency response system to better prepare for future disasters in areas that don't fit neatly in the international state system. And it raises more questions about the future of Syria's northwest, especially now that, as of July, the UN Security Council's exceptional mandate for cross-border assistance in Syria has ended. The cross-border humanitarian response is now changing, at a moment when needs inside the northwest are greater than ever.

Century International: “How Lebanon’s Elites Sabotaged an IMF Rescue”

At Century International, The Policy Initiative's Sami Zoughaib and I have a new commentary that works as a short, shareable version of our recent report on Lebanon’s stalled IMF talks: https://tcf.org/content/commentary/how-lebanons-elites-sabotaged-an-imf-rescue/

You can still read the full report (https://tcf.org/content/report/the-shadow-plan-how-lebanese-elites-are-sabotaging-their-countrys-imf-lifeline/) if you want some granular detail and punchy quotes, but now you also have this brief commentary if you want to skip right to the report’s most important (and distressing 😬) points.

Century International/The Policy Initiative: “The Shadow Plan: How Lebanese Elites Are Sabotaging Their Country’s IMF Lifeline”

I have a new report out, this time a collaboration with Sami Zoughaib of Lebanese think tank The Policy Initiative on how Lebanon's IMF talks have gone so badly awry:

https://tcf.org/content/report/the-shadow-plan-how-lebanese-elites-are-sabotaging-their-countrys-imf-lifeline/

Sami and I started work on this report late last year. It's been clear since early in Lebanon's economic crisis that the country's only hope for real recovery was an IMF program. Yet there seemed to be very little reliable information on how the country's IMF talks were really going – how they worked, who was involved, and why they didn't actually seem to be leading anywhere useful. This all seems pretty important! For Lebanon, the stakes of reaching an IMF deal – or not – are huge. Sami and I set to work figuring out what was going on, so we could make sense of things for (primarily) a Lebanese readership.

What we found out was definitely enlightening, if not especially positive or encouraging. Our report lays out what we learned about Lebanon's IMF talks have proceeded, and why, absent some major course change, Lebanon will not have an IMF program. The main problem is a Lebanese ruling elite hostile to reforms that threaten their entrenched interests. That hits Lebanon's IMF talks in two main ways: first, in the disconnect between these elites and an official Lebanese negotiating team that doesn't really represent them, and can't properly commit to reforms on their behalf; and second, in a political media discourse too full of bogus narratives and disinformation for people to make sense of what's going on.

Lebanon's ruling elites all profess their commitment to reaching an IMF program. Their revealed preference, though, is inaction and an alternative, non-IMF "shadow plan." It's the "shadow plan" to which Lebanon has been subjected since the start of its crisis – a super-regressive economic correction that is stabilizing the Lebanese economy at a new, low level on top of the country's middle class and poor.

Our report includes some recommendations for interested outsiders, including the IMF and donor countries. But mainly we hope to address members of Lebanese civil society, who will need to keep working to inform the Lebanese public about the issues and the stakes; and the public itself, who, with a better sense of what's really going on, can hopefully reclaim some agency in this process.

This report is a collaboration between Century International and Lebanon's The Policy Initiative (www.thepolicyinitiative.org). TPI was founded in 2021, and since then it has produced exactly the kind of research on Lebanon that I, personally, have been looking for. It was super partnering with TPI, which I think is a really exciting and important initiative. You can also read our report on TPI's website and in PDF form here: https://www.thepolicyinitiative.org/article/details/294/the-shadow-plan-how-lebanese-elites-are-sabotaging-their-country%E2%80%99s-imf-lifeline

Century International: “A Humane Choice: Sanctions Relief for Syria’s Earthquake”

I have a new commentary out today for Century International, on the Biden administration's decision to temporarily relax Syria sanctions to facilitate earthquake relief – clearly the responsible, humane thing to do, and a move worth defending.

https://tcf.org/content/commentary/a-humane-choice-sanctions-relief-for-syrias-earthquake/

Days after the deadly earthquake that struck Turkey and Syria, the U.S. Treasury issued a general license authorizing earthquake relief to Syria that would otherwise be prohibited by sanctions. The license broadened the scope of actors permitted to contribute to the earthquake response. That helped mitigate the "chilling effect" of sanctions – which can discourage even legitimate, permitted activities – and likely ensured a bigger, faster emergency response for Syrians in need, at a moment when size and speed really mattered.

Some in Washington are, unsurprisingly, up in arms. They argue it was unnecessary given sanctions' existing humanitarian exemptions, and they claim it will enrich and encourage normalization with Damascus. They are wrong. But the Biden administration hasn't really made that case, and it hasn't communicated effectively why issuing this license was the right thing to do for disaster-stricken Syrians.

This license was the normal human way to respond to a natural disaster and humanitarian crisis. And as it comes under attack in Washington, it's worth defending – even if the Biden administration may be reluctant to do that itself.

War on the Rocks: “Turkey's Russian Red Light in Syria”

I have a new article out today at War on the Rocks, this time on how Russia – despite Turkish officials’ protests to the contrary – has, in fact, had an effective veto on Turkish military interventions in Syria; and how Moscow has now used that to maneuver Ankara into normalizing with Damascus.

https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/turkeys-russian-red-light-in-syria/

Turkey and Syria's ministers of defense met alongside their Russian counterpart in Moscow this week. It was their first meeting in more than a decade, and a major step towards the normalization of Turkish-Syrian relations.

Moscow has been pushing Ankara to normalize with Damascus for years now. To that end, Russia has used a) its veto on another Turkish ground offensive in Syria and b) Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan's insistence on another intervention against Kurdish-led Syrian militants ahead of next year's Turkish elections to finally get normalization in motion.

Turkish officials claim they don't need "permission" or a "green light" to take new counterterrorism action in Syria. But it's not true. For years, Turkey has needed a nod from Russia to intervene in Syria – in the article, I lay out the accumulated evidence – and now Russia has translated that into a political breakthrough.

Century International: “The Mysterious Pipeline for ISIS Recruits from Northern Lebanon”

I have a new report out today for The Century Foundation's Century International, this time on how dozens of young men from Lebanon's Tripoli disappeared last year, apparently to join the Islamic State in Iraq.

https://tcf.org/content/report/the-mysterious-pipeline-for-isis-recruits-from-northern-lebanon/

Media reports earlier this year largely attributed these Tripoli youths’ enlistment in the Islamic State to poverty, and to Sunni marginalization and grievance; Lebanese officials told media that the young men had been lured with promises of dollar wages. But I think this narrative missed key aspects of the story, including how these men’s mobilization to Iraq really worked. It also reinforced Tripoli’s unfair reputation as an incubator for extremism.

What happened to these young Lebanese men seems less about why they decided to go to Iraq, and more about who took them there, and how. It's also about the particularities of these young men's backgrounds – something more specific than general Sunni grievance – that made them vulnerable to bad actors.

These young men’s recruitment by the Islamic State, properly understood, can help us better grasp why and how people are drawn into jihadist groups, and how to view a place like Tripoli.

Century International: “Syrian Prisoner Amnesty Could Be a Breakthrough—If Damascus Is Ready to Do More”

I have a new report out today for The Century Foundation’s Century International, this time on a newly expansive amnesty announced by Syrian authorities. This amnesty decree could, potentially, allow for some diplomatic opening – but only if Damascus takes its implementation further:

https://tcf.org/content/report/syrian-prisoner-amnesty-could-be-a-breakthrough-if-damascus-is-ready-to-do-more/

On April 30, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad announced an unprecedentedly broad amnesty for Syrians accused of "terror" offenses – a charge Syrian authorities have used to prosecute not just opposition militants, but dissidents more generally. Assad has announced more than a dozen amnesties since 2011, but past amnesties have been more limited and conditional. This new amnesty, by contrast, could benefit thousands of detainees and other Syrians wanted on "terror" charges.

In the days following the decree, Syrian authorities released hundreds of detainees, but in haphazard fashion; bogus lists of names circulated online, and the families of Syria's detained and missing congregated in central Damascus and elsewhere in hopes of seeing their loved ones. Releases have since slowed, maybe because Damascus is rationalizing the system of review and release – or maybe because releases are effectively over. The numbers released under the amnesty so far remain small compared to the tens of thousands detained or missing in Syria.

In the meantime, Syrian officials have communicated to external audiences – in public and in private – that this amnesty is a turning point in Syria's efforts at domestic reconciliation. They've also seemed to imply, in meetings with foreign interlocutors, that they are looking to open up a more reciprocal dynamic with outside countries.

International diplomats and officials following the amnesty's implementation and familiar with Syrian officials' outreach say that the decree's implementation has not, so far, been sufficient to merit some action in return – but that it could be, if Syrian government is prepared to go farther. Now it's on Damascus to decide if it's ready to implement this amnesty more fully and transparently, and to involve international organizations like the International Committee for the Red Cross that could lend the measure real credibility.

Century International: “Economic Collapse—Not Elections—Will Shape Lebanon’s Future”

I have a new commentary for The Century Foundation’s Century International today, on what I think this weekend's Lebanese elections do and do not mean for the country's politics:

https://tcf.org/content/commentary/economic-collapse-not-elections-will-shape-lebanons-future

Lebanon's parliamentary elections on Sunday are the first since the country's mass anti-government protests, beginning in October 2019; its economic crisis, among the worst in modern history; and the August 2020 explosion at Beirut port, which devastated the capital and killed more than two hundred people. The country has changed substantially since its last elections in 2018. And yet: despite all that, most people inside and outside the country expect this vote to deliver more of the same, and to reproduce the country's existing political leadership.

In this commentary, I expand on the ways I think these elections will and will not matter for Lebanon, and how an ordinary citizen's vote actually seems to relate to the country's trajectory. I also talk about where I believe real change in Lebanon will come from – namely, the country's ongoing economic collapse, which will make things in Lebanon different, and probably worse.

Foreign Affairs: “The Ponzi Scheme That Broke Lebanon”

I have a new article at Foreign Affairs today, on the United States' newfound commitment to fighting corruption in Lebanon:

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/lebanon/2022-04-18/ponzi-scheme-broke-lebanon

The Biden administration has declared combating corruption a national security priority. Lebanon is somewhere the administration's commitment to fighting corruption really matters – corruption is central to Lebanon's economic collapse, and any effort at national rescue, to be successful, will require steps to root out corruption.

Unfortunately, though, the United States faces a major credibility problem on corruption in Lebanon. If Biden administration officials want to demonstrate they're really serious about fighting corruption in Lebanon, they'll have to do more. And they'll need to fix the United States' seeming blind spot on Lebanon's grandest corruption: its central bank's disastrous "Ponzi scheme," and, more generally, the incestuous relationship between Lebanon's political and financial elites that ultimately bankrupted the country.

Century International: “Russia’s War in Ukraine Will Also Hurt Syria”

Out today for Century International, I have a new report on the Ukraine conflict's ramifications for Syria:

https://tcf.org/content/report/russias-war-in-ukraine-will-also-hurt-syria/

I see Russia's invasion of Ukraine having two main (and related) impacts on Syria, on both the humanitarian situation in the country and Syria-related diplomacy:

First, the war in Ukraine threatens a global food crisis, and already food-insecure Syria seems especially vulnerable to those effects. The Ukraine conflict has disrupted world grain and energy markets and interrupted supplies of commodities essential to Syrians' diets, including wheat and sunflower oil. Now it's unclear if Syria's government and de facto authorities can import enough wheat to produce the local bread on which Syrians rely, and higher food prices more generally will make it even harder for Syrians to feed their families.

Second, the war in Ukraine also marks the apparent end of a U.S.-Russian humanitarian dialogue that, over the past year, had yielded important compromises on aid to Syria. Whatever potential existed for further agreements that might have benefited Syrians now seems lost. Moreover, as the U.S. and Russia explored other possible humanitarian compromises, they had been jointly interested in stability and relative calm in Syria. Now that seems over, with uncertain, potentially dangerous consequences.

Century International: “U.S. Policy Finally Distinguishes Between Lebanon and Hezbollah”

I have a new piece for Century International, this time on how U.S. policymakers ought to understand Lebanon's present crisis and to balance the United States' main policy aims in the country: preventing a failed state, and countering Hizbullah.

https://tcf.org/content/report/u-s-policy-finally-distinguishes-lebanon-hezbollah/

Countering the influence of Lebanese political party and militant organization Hizbullah has often overshadowed other U.S. priorities in Lebanon. Now, though, Lebanon is suffering a political-economic crisis that ranks among the worst in modern history. That crisis requires attention in its own right, if U.S. policymakers hope to prevent Lebanon from becoming an even more thoroughly failed state and source of instability regionally.

That crisis, moreover, is not mainly about Hizbullah. Rather, those most responsible for Lebanon's implosion are a combined political-financial elite that some Lebanese have termed "Hizb al-Masref," or the "Bank Party." These elites ruined Lebanon's state and economy. Now they're fighting to defend their own equities in Lebanon's national bankruptcy, and destroying Lebanese society in the process.

For U.S. policy purposes, Hizbullah is a mostly different, separate problem. And that seems to be how the Biden administration has approached it, for the most part – one policy for Lebanon; and one for countering Hizbullah.

I say: good. Preventing a failed state in Lebanon and countering Hizbullah are mostly distinct lines of effort, which policymakers ought to consider on their own terms and pursue in parallel. Trying to combine these two objectives, on other hand, is a recipe for muddled, ineffective policy. If U.S. policymakers hope to address Lebanon's crisis at all usefully, they'll need to walk and chew gum at the same time.

Century International: “‘Early Recovery’ Aid Can Provide Vital Relief to Syrians—If Donors Follow Through”

I have a new piece for The Century Foundation’s Century International, this time on “early recovery” aid to Syria and the contentious politics around it:

https://tcf.org/content/commentary/early-recovery-aid-can-provide-vital-relief-syrians-donors-follow/

In July, the UN Security Council unanimously endorsed humanitarian “early recovery” assistance in Syria as part of a larger compromise on aid to Syria. Early recovery (or "resilience") aid is aid intended to bolster recipients' ability to support themselves, and thus sustainably reduce humanitarian need. It often involves support for basic services. Previously, the U.S. and some other donors had resisted early recovery aid, which they saw as too close to support for Syria's reconstruction.

After July's Security Council vote, we're seemingly past that. Every major donor country supports early recovery assistance to Syria, at least in theory. There are still questions about the practice, though: donors are debating amongst themselves over how to define "early recovery" and avoid contributing to reconstruction that buttresses the Syrian government; and it's not clear where the money for early recovery will actually come from.

Despite all that: this latest international endorsement of early recovery opens up new possibilities for donor aid to beleaguered Syrians, including, in seemingly the most ambitious early recovery initiative so far, a proposed effort to rescue water facilities on which millions of Syrians depend. Now it's on donors to follow through and deliver the support that Syrians need.

War on the Rocks: “Lights on in Lebanon: Limiting the Fallout from U.S. Sanctions on Syria”

For War on the Rocks, my new article on how the Biden administration's handling of a Lebanon energy project's sanctions implications seemingly fits into a more careful, precise approach to Syria sanctions, and a larger effort to mitigate sanctions' collateral damage:

https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/lights-on-in-lebanon-limiting-the-fallout-from-u-s-sanctions-on-syria/

The Century Foundation: “Lebanon Is in Free Fall. Opposition Groups Have Radically Different Ideas about How to Save It.”

My new report for Century International, on how members of Lebanon's opposition envision political change in a country that's collapsing around them:

https://tcf.org/content/report/lebanon-free-fall-opposition-groups-radically-different-ideas-save/

For nearly two years, Lebanon has been experiencing an economic implosion almost unparalleled in modern history. Foreign donors have conditioned a bailout on reform measures that contravene the interests of the country's sectarian political elites, who have been unwilling to play along. Yet those same elites remain solidly in control of the country, having withstood the challenge of Lebanon's 2019 nationwide protest movement. Today they preside over a country that is becoming steadily poorer and more desperate.

Saving Lebanon seemingly comes down to either convincing the country's political establishment to do what's responsible and necessary, even at the expense of its members' interests; or, failing that, producing some new national political leadership capable of managing Lebanon's existential crisis.

I talked to the opposition parties and activist groups that identify with that 2019 protest movement – the "17 October Revolution" – to hear how, in practice, they're aiming to achieve political change. These "17 October" groups' various theories of change are a main distinction between them, maybe more than their substantive political differences. Some are pursuing an immediate pacted transition with Lebanon's regime; others are focusing on next year's parliamentary and municipal elections; and still others are prioritizing more long-term grassroots change. All of them are attempting to theorize political change in Lebanon, from Lebanon.

DAWN’s Democracy in Exile: “The Dire Costs of Ending the U.N.'s Cross-Border Aid Into Syria”

My new piece for DAWN’s Democracy in Exile on the upcoming Security Council vote to renew the UN cross-border aid mandate in Syria:

https://dawnmena.org/the-dire-costs-of-ending-the-u-n-s-cross-border-aid-into-syria

The Security Council vote is important, first of all, for its life-and-death human stakes. If Syria's northwest loses the UN's contribution to the cross-border aid response from Turkey, the humanitarian implications will be disastrous. To take just one key example: other aid organizations insist they can replace only a fraction of the food assistance the UN provides to these vulnerable Syrians, densely packed into the country's most food-insecure region. (And for more on Syria's hunger crisis nationwide: https://tcf.org/content/report/syrians-going-hungry-will-west-act/)

Yet the renewal vote is also important as a test of the Biden administration's early Syria policy, which has prioritized alleviating humanitarian suffering inside Syria. To that end, the administration has seemingly adopted a more-carrot-than-stick approach to winning Russia's assent to cross-border renewal – because, given how the Security Council works, there is no good alternative to achieving some minimum consensus among the council's members.

The Century Foundation: “Syrians Are Going Hungry. Will the West Act?”

My new report for The Century Foundation: Syrians are going hungry, and in unprecedented, alarming numbers – WFP reports that nearly 60 percent of the country's population is food insecure. So what's behind Syria's hunger crisis? And what can U.S. and other Western policymakers do about it?

https://tcf.org/content/report/syrians-going-hungry-will-west-act/

The Daily Beast: “Biden’s Syria Airstrikes May Feel Like Trump Déjà Vu. Here’s What’s Different.”

I wrote a quick piece for The Daily Beast on how to read the Biden Administration's airstrikes on Iran-linked paramilitaries in Syria this week:

https://www.thedailybeast.com/bidens-syria-airstrikes-may-feel-like-trump-deja-vu-heres-why-its-different

Thursday evening's U.S. airstrikes on Iraqi paramilitaries on the Syrian-Iraqi border were a response to persistent attacks on U.S. and partner forces in Iraq. Yet the strikes – in both their execution and messaging – also seem to have been a conscious attempt by the new Biden Administration to distinguish itself from Trump's wild, dangerous approach to Iraq and Iran, which nearly led to regional war. Even as the Biden team tries to adopt a more deliberate, calibrated approach, though, it's not clear that will be enough to deal with the mess Trump left for the U.S. in Iraq.

War on the Rocks: “Redefining Victory in America’s War Against the Islamic State in Syria”

At War on the Rocks today, I have a new article urging the incoming Biden team to revisit U.S. counter-ISIS aims in Syria, after the Trump Administration twisted the definition of counter-ISIS victory to justify pursuing all sorts of other, unrelated policy ends.

https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/redefining-victory-in-americas-war-against-the-islamic-state-in-syria/

Under President Obama, America originally set out to "degrade and ultimately destroy" (or "ultimately defeat") the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria and neighboring Iraq. In 2017, though, the Trump Administration changed the United States' stated aim to ISIS's "enduring defeat." "Enduring defeat," as Trump officials defined it, entailed not only the effective incapacitation of ISIS but also preventing its notional future return. "Enduring defeat" thus also meant addressing supposed "root causes" behind ISIS's rise, which, these officials argued, required dramatic change to Syria's political system and the removal of Iran-commanded forces from the country – things that will not happen, by all indications. The Trump administration had adopted an expansive, rubberized definition of "enduring defeat," stretched to cover all the United States' other, non-ISIS policy aims in Syria and to justify open-ended U.S. military involvement in the country.

The incoming Biden Administration's initial review of U.S. policy in Syria is a chance to revisit this elasticized definition of U.S. counter-ISIS objectives. "Enduring defeat," in the all-encompassing terms with which the Trump Administration defined it, is not achievable in Syria. The Biden team ought to ask, then: What does it really mean, for U.S. national security purposes, to "defeat" ISIS in Syria? And what level of U.S. involvement does that require?