The Century Foundation: "Syria’s Rebels Lose a Symbolic Stronghold"

New from me for The Century Foundation:

Rebel Darayya has fallen. The Damascus suburb meant vastly different things to each side of the war, but both sides seem to recognize the town’s fall as a harbinger of regime victory on what is arguably Syria’s most important front—the interior of the western corridor running down Syria’s Mediterranean coast to Damascus, sometimes called “useful Syria.”

https://tcf.org/content/commentary/syrias-rebels-lose-symbolic-stronghold/

The Century Foundation: "In Syrian Proxy War, America Can Keep Its Hands Clean or It Can Get Things Done"

New from me for The Century Foundation:

Amateur footage of a Syrian rebel beheading a captive in the back of a pickup truck ought to be a wake-up call – sometimes, this is what proxy war looks like. So is the United States in or out?

https://tcf.org/content/commentary/syrian-proxy-war-america-can-keep-hands-clean-can-get-things-done/

On AlHurra: Jabhat al-Nusrah and Its Break with al-Qaeda

My appearance on AlHurra TV with Mona Wehbi to discuss Jabhat al-Nusrah and its split with al-Qaeda. (Arabic)

The Century Foundation: "Al Qaeda Quits Syria in Name Only"

New from me for The Century Foundation on the ostensible end of Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrah and why there may be less to Nusrah’s break with al-Qaeda than meets the eye:

https://tcf.org/content/commentary/al-qaeda-quits-syria-name/

The Century Foundation: "Are Syria’s Rebels at Al Qaeda’s Mercy?"

New from me for The Century Foundation:

Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrah attacked another northern “Free Syrian Army” brigade earlier this month – but now the episode looks more like an interlude in a power struggle within that brigade than simply an act of Nusra villainy. What that means for disentangling Nusrah and Syria’s rebels:

https://tcf.org/content/commentary/syrias-rebels-al-qaedas-mercy/

The Century Foundation: "Four Perspectives on the War in Syria"

New from The Century Foundation, a roundtable discussion of Syria featuring me, Thanassis Cambanis, Michael Hanna and Aron Lund. The piece features our general read on the war and our (mostly pessimistic) take on the policy options now available:

https://tcf.org/content/report/four-perspectives-war-syria/

Jabhat al-Nusrah Media Official: "A comment on David Ignatius’s article in the Washington Post"

Below I’ve translated the response from Abu Ammar al-Shami, head of Jabhat al-Nusrah’s media office, to David Ignatius’s July 19 Washington Post article. Abu Ammar’s rebuttal of Ignatius is a demonstration of the political trap the Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate has set for the United States and its allies.

Ignatius’s article contends, based on U.S. official sources, that Jabhat al-Nusrah seems to be plotting external operations against Europe and the United States and that is operatives have tried to infiltrate Syrian refugee communities in Europe. Ignatius’s report comes as the United States seems to have struck a tentative agreement with Russia on expanded military and intelligence coordination with Russia against both Nusrah and the self-proclaimed Islamic State. (Ignatius’s article also says, based on an upcoming Institute for the Study of War forecast, that Nusrah will merge with Ahrar al-Sham later this year, which I think is unlikely.)

Jabhat al-Nusrah has repeatedly denied that it intends to conduct attacks abroad, a denial that Abu Ammar repeats in the tweets I’ve translated below. Nusrah leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani stressed in an interview last year that – as per instructions from al-Qaeda leader Aymen al-Zawahiri himself – Nusrah’s mission is to topple the Assad regime and institute Islamic rule in Syria, not to endanger the Syrian jihad by using Syria as a launching pad for attacks on the West.

Abu Ammar dismisses the U.S. government suspicions relayed by Ignatius as just another false pretext for war, a prelude to a military campaign against Jabhat al-Nusrah that will strengthen the Syria regime of Bashar al-Assad and pave the way for a U.S.-sponsored political resolution in the regime’s favor.

But when it comes to Jabhat al-Nusrah’s ambitions beyond Syria – and here’s the thing – who knows. Aside from Nusrah insiders and maybe some regional and international policymakers being fed information of variable reliability by secret squirrels, I don’t know if anyone has confident or reliable insight into what Nusrah is planning.

In the same interview in which he denied plotting to strike the West, Jolani said that if American bombing continued against Jabhat al-Nusrah, then Nusrah’s “options are open.” “If this situation [i.e., U.S. bombing] continues as is,” Jolani said, “I think there will be ramifications that won’t be in favor of the West and America.”

So Jabhat al-Nusrah can, hypothetically, flip that switch. And if it has been sending members abroad, it may be doing the advance work to ensure it has operatives in place and that its options are, indeed, open.

But what Jabhat al-Nusrah has also done is to make itself so central to Syria’s insurgency, particularly in the Syrian north, that any stepped-up campaign of U.S. bombing on Nusrah will inevitably weaken and endanger the broader armed opposition to the Assad regime. And absent a high-profile attack on the West and a claim of responsibility on Nusrah letterhead – not suspicions of attack planning or nebulous warnings – expanded targeting of Nusrah will be read by many in the Syrian opposition as an intervention on behalf of the Assad regime.

So Jabhat al-Nusrah gets to have it both ways. It can – maybe, allegedly – prepare for external operation contingencies. And at the same time, it can claim innocence and wrap itself in a broader Syrian opposition constituency that the United States and its allies are reluctant to alienate.

As for Syria’s other rebels, Nusrah asks them for their aid and brotherly solidarity. But, left unspoken, there is a reverse edge to Nusrah’s appeals for aid: As Nusrah has made clear, it reserves the right to dismantle any faction it judges to be a Crusader stooge or an enemy of the Islamic project in Syria.

As the United States potentially gears up for an expanded campaign on Jabhat al-Nusrah, it seems Nusrah has lashed itself to Syria’s rebels – and their fate is now shared, like it or not.

Translation follows:

A comment on David Ignatius’s article in the Washington Post:

No one is fooled anymore by the motions of American propaganda in the leadup to every war and act of destruction. It invents flimsy reasons and false claims to condition public opinion against [its enemy].

To target Jabhat al-Nusrah is to target the Syrian revolution on behalf of Assad, to weaken the strength of the mujahideen, and to tilt the scales in favor of these Rafidhi [derog., Shi’ite] militias on a number of fronts.

Jabhat al-Nusrah has made clear before that its project is to aid (nusrah) the oppressed in Syria and make them the priority in its staged strategy to bring down the Nuseiri (derog., Alawite) regime and its allies.

In Syria today, we are in urgent need of those who will support us and come to join the fight. [We don’t need] to send men across the ocean to fight an enemy that is already fighting us today, in person and with its tools.

We in Jabhat al-Nusrah stress that, in the interest of keeping the Syrian jihad ongoing and strong, all other desirable interests, including targeting the West and America, fall away and disappear.

And the other mujahid factions need to recognize that the elimination of Jabhat al-Nusrah today and permitting this Russian-American agreement to proceed without a position from you – for God, and then for history…

… Amounts to the abandonment of your brothers and the weakening of your own strength. Afterwards, America will be satisfied with nothing less than your submission to a political solution tilted towards Assad and his allies.

We’ve only thought the best of you, so aid your brothers and defend them through your words, through announcing the truth and through deflecting on their behalf. For God is the best guardian, and He is the most merciful of the merciful.

تعليقا على مقال الواشنطن بوست للكاتب ديفيد أغناشيوس:
(1)

— أبو عمّار الشّامي (@Ammari011) July 21, 2016

لم تعد تنطلي على أحد مسارات الدعايةالإعلامية الأمريكية قبيل كل حرب أو دمار
فتخلق لذلك أسباب واهية ودعاوى كاذبة بغية تهيئة الرأي العام ضده
2

— أبو عمّار الشّامي (@Ammari011) July 21, 2016

وإن استهداف #جبهة_النصرة استهداف للثورة السورية لصالح الأسد، وإضعاف لقوة المجاهدين، وميل لكفة الميليشيات الرافضية في العديد من الجبهات
3

— أبو عمّار الشّامي (@Ammari011) July 21, 2016

وقد بينت #جبهة_النصرة من قبل أن مشروعها هو نصرة المستضعفين في الشام وجعلهم أولويةفي استراتيجتها المرحلية حتى إسقاط النظام النصيري وحلفائه
4

— أبو عمّار الشّامي (@Ammari011) July 21, 2016

وإننا في #الشام اليوم في حاجة ماسة لمن ينصرنا وينفر إلينا لا أن نرسل الشباب لما وراء البحار ليقاتلوا عدوا يقاتلنا اليوم بنفسه وبأدواته
5

— أبو عمّار الشّامي (@Ammari011) July 21, 2016

ونؤكد في #جبهة_النصرة أن أمام مصلحة الحفاظ على الجهاد الشامي قائما قويا تنزوي وتغيب كافة المصالح المرجوحة الأخرى من استهداف الغرب وأمريكا
6

— أبو عمّار الشّامي (@Ammari011) July 21, 2016

وعلى الفصائل المجاهدة إدراك أن في القضاء على #جبهة_النصرة اليوم والسماح للاتفاق الروسي الامريكي بالمرور دون موقف منكم لله ثم للتاريخ…
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— أبو عمّار الشّامي (@Ammari011) July 21, 2016

لهو الخذلان لإخوانكم وإضعاف لقوتكم، ولن ترضى أمريكا بعدها منكم سوى الإذعان لحل سياسي يرجح في كفة الأسد وحلفائه.
8

— أبو عمّار الشّامي (@Ammari011) July 21, 2016

وما ظننا بكم إلا خيرا، فأعينوا إخوانكم وادفعوا عنهم باللسان والبيان والتخذيل، فالله خير حافظا وهو أرحم الراحمين
9
انتهى

— أبو عمّار الشّامي (@Ammari011) July 21, 2016

Addendum on the Twitter Account Attributed to Khaz'al al-Sarhan

After the publication of my recent article on the New Syrian Army for The Century Foundation, New Syrian Army commander Khaz’al al-Sarhan has denied that the Twitter account in his name with which I corresponded belonged to him.

A full accounting of my correspondence with the account and attempts to verify it is available at the bottom of the original article. What follows are screenshots of my conversation with the account over DM.

The Century Foundation: "Suppose America Gave a Proxy War in Syria and Nobody Came?"

New from me for the Century Foundation:

Last Wednesday, the New Syrian Army—America’s best, maybe only, hope to challenge the self-proclaimed Islamic State in its east Syrian stronghold—launched a daring attack on the heart of Islamic State territory.

By Thursday, it had gone wrong. Islamic State had been waiting, and the New Syrian Army only barely avoided being annihilated by circling jihadists.

For the United States, it was just the latest in a series of mostly unsuccessful attempts to field a Syrian Arab proxy force against Islamic State. The defeat was yet another example of how America’s agenda has run up against the factional and personal politics of Syria’s rebels, as well as the basic disconnect between the U.S. priority of combating Islamic State and most rebels’ aim of toppling the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

https://tcf.org/content/report/suppose-america-gave-proxy-war-syria-nobody-came/

War on the Rocks: "Russia Is in Charge in Syria: How Moscow Took Control of the Battlefield and Negotiating Table"

New from me at War on the Rocks:

Russia has leveraged its September 2015 military intervention on behalf of the Assad regime to establish itself as the central military actor in Syria’s war. Russia has, in turn, used its military primacy to oblige others — including the United States — to treat it as the gatekeeper to a negotiated solution to the conflict.

But Russia is now invested heavily in a political process that, thanks to uncooperative Syrians on all sides of the war, seems unlikely to pan out, leaving Moscow to grapple with how to deliver “success” in Syria. Unless America is willing to risk a dangerous and unpredictable confrontation with Russia, the course of Syria’s war hinges on what Russia does next.

Russia is in Charge in Syria: How Moscow Took Control of the Battlefield and Negotiating Table

The Daily Beast: "The Home of Syria’s Only Real Rebels"

New from me on The Daily Beast:

Syria’s northwest Idlib province is a tense, sometimes scary place, pulled between Islamist and jihadist factions vying for control but too intertangled to really fight each other. Now Idlib – for better or for worse – has become the heart of Syria’s armed rebellion against the Assad regime.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/06/17/the-home-of-syria-s-only-real-rebels.html

RFE/RL's "Under the Black Flag" Blog: "Al-Qaeda Speaks The Language Of Syrian Sectarianism"

New from me on RFE/RL’s “Under the Black Flag” blog:

Jabhat al-Nusrah’s top religious official makes an appeal for jihad in Syrian terms – and it turns out that when al-Qaeda wants to tap into an indigenously Syrian sentiment to fuel their jihad, it looks to toxic, even genocidal, sectarianism.

http://www.rferl.org/content/black-flag-syria-islamic-state-al-qaeda-sectarianism-alawites/27788931.html

On Ahrar al-Sham and Elitism

A follow-on note on my War on the Rocks piece today about Ahrar al-Sham deputy leader Ali al-Omar’s recent lecture, and what it means for how Ahrar presents and understands itself:

Among my arguments, I said that “Al-Omar uses most of his lecture to resist the purism and elitism of Salafi-jihadism.” Hassan Hassan responded to the piece with several points, including this:

1. Sam argues Ahrar al-Sham rejects the “purism and elitism” of Salafi-jihadism. The official himself argues in favour of elitism in the talk itself, not sure why Sam overlooked that. The official even mentions the word “elite”, it is there in the talk — not to speak about the official’s frequent arrogant references about how Syrian society has been absent from true Islam for several decades and that none of the “pious” was ever allowed to preach inside Syria. As to “purism”, purism is a spectrum within Salafi-jihadism which is, again, fluid not static. Whether Ahrar al-Sham is purist or less purist than ISIS isn’t a valid argument in this context.

Yes, of course al-Omar uses the word “elite,” just as he mentions the Taliban. But the context is relevant, if you want to understand his intent and his broader message.

The relevant section (43:59-48:07) is translated and transcribed below. In it, al-Omar says that Ahrar is “between the elite and populism,” although he also makes clear that he regards Ahrar as the elite or vanguard that ought to lead the mass rebellion.

But if you read the entire passage – and this is what I was referring to with Salafi-jihadism’s “purism and elitism” – it’s clear that al-Omar is arguing against jihadists’ narrow exclusivity, their disdain and hostility for other factions that don’t satisfy their ideological litmus test. Al-Omar is saying that jihadists’ ultra-selectivity about who has an appropriately pure doctrine is unreasonable and impracticable. Instead, al-Omar is arguing that Ahrar has made the sound choice by allying itself with the Muslim rebel mainstream – including those who may not be perfectly devout – in the service of “اصطفاف سني شامل (rallying Sunnis in their entirety).”

This passage actually comes immediately before al-Omar’s reference to the Taliban, which, again, is not used to offer a blanket endorsement of the Taliban. Rather, al-Omar employs the example of the Taliban make a similar point, arguing in favor of setting aside pure creedal purity in favor of a more broad-based, inclusive model.

“It’s absolutely important that people realize – and particularly those bearing this project, which we’re talking about – that our battle today is the battle of Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah, and I said before. Therefore, we’re looking to rally Sunnis in their entirety. We don’t pay attention to minor details – this isn’t the time. So what do we mean by that? Right now my higher goal is toppling the regime – that’s an intermediate goal, you could say. What you have is that the Rafidhah (derog., Shi’ites) and those who back them have closed ranks. The Rafidhah, from all over the world, fight us now. With them are the Nuseiriyyah (derog., Alawites) here, despite the differences in their creeds. The Russian atheists have also intervened on their behalf in the battle. So there’s a closing of ranks. It’s not possible to face this front line, this march, these parties without Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah also closing ranks. All of them. So we don’t get into minor things that are less than that. All of Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah are targeted. So we all need to fight to defend Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah.

“The Prophet, peace be upon him, said: ‘May you conquer Constantinople. And how great will be its emir, and how great that army will be.’ Muhammad al-Fatih, Muhammad II, who conquered Constantinople – and who the Prophet, peace be upon him, praised – was Maturidi in his creed. His creed was Maturidi. In terms of his school of Islam, he was Hanafi, and his creed was Maturidi. The Prophet, peace be upon him, said: ‘And how great will be its emir, and how great that army will be.’ So all the types of Muslims fought with him, Muhammad al-Fatih. Salahaddin Ayyoubi was Ash’ari. He was Ash’ari. He conquered al-Quds – we all sing his praises, we all reference Salahaddin Ayyoubi in books, sermons and lectures, and so on. And he was Ash’ari. And he conquered al-Quds, and all the scholars fought alongside him. All the scholars – the Salafis, the Soufis – under the idea of fighting as the Islamic nation, Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah. These models realized victory. Show me one model that realized victory and limited itself to one segment among the different segments of Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah.

“The principle is that Ahrar is between the elite and populism, you could say. Between the elite and populism. We see that the entirety of Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah need to be involved, with the elite leading the way – those with correct approaches, and with straight thinking. But I asked you before: Is it better for me to fight under someone whose religion I don’t think is complete, or who isn’t entirely devout, or is it better for him to fight under my banner? Which is better? Not to recommend myself, I mean, but for someone who views himself as having the right approach. Which is better? For him to fight under someone who isn’t that devout, or for the less devout man to fight under him?” [Audience member: The second option.] “Of course, the second option. There’s no doubt in that. When someone less devout fights under someone who’s more devout, then the scale is balanced. But now, when Ahrar al-Sham implemented that, critics pounced on it, even though – as I said before – Salah al-Din al-Ayyoubi, Muhammad al-Fateh and lots of other role models were Ash’aris, God have mercy on them. And they led these conquests, and they were from Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah.”

War on the Rocks: "How Ahrar al-Sham Has Come to Define the Kaleidoscope of the Syrian Civil War"

New from me on War on the Rocks:

It’s indicative of the state of the Syrian war that “What exactly is Ahrar al-Sham?” has become a question of international political and diplomatic importance. Now opposition faction and Islamist movement Ahrar al-Sham has itself weighed in with a lecture by its deputy leader, in which he defines Ahrar – and, just as important, makes clear what the movement defines itself against.

How Ahrar al-Sham Has Come to Define the Kaleidoscope of the Syrian Civil War

VICE News: "US-Backed Rebels Struggle to Fend Off Islamic State Offensive in Northern Syria"

New from me at VICE News:

The U.S. and Turkey backed rebels to take ISIS-held Aleppo – it hasn’t worked. Inside the frustration and recriminations in north Aleppo, where rebels are now fighting just to survive.

https://news.vice.com/article/us-backed-rebels-struggle-to-fend-off-the-islamic-state-offensive-in-northern-syria

RFE/RL's "Under the Black Flag" Blog: "Al-Qaeda's Ayman Al-Zawahri Plays Politics"

New from me on al-Qaeda chief Aymen al-Zawahiri’s last message and its intended Syrian audience. (Hint: Not Nusrah.)

http://www.rferl.org/content/al-qaeda-al-zawahri-plays-politics/27746829.html

Abu Ali al-Anbari: "They came to die."

Below is a translated snippet from jihadist evangelist and fundraiser Abdullah al-Muheisini’s testimony case against ISIS’s irreligious conduct and the events leading to January 2014’s explosion of fighting between Syria’s rebels and the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Al-Muheisini’s account is republished from a Telegram group in which he argued his case against ISIS’s conduct with a number of ISIS supporters. In this excerpt, al-Muheisini unsuccessfully appeals to ISIS second-in-command “Abu Ali al-Anbari” to put a stop to the car bombs ISIS was deploying against Syrian rebels. The episode apparently took place after ISIS hit Liwa al-Tawhid’s Infantry School base with car bombs on February 1, 2014.

I don’t if there’s a bigger lesson to take from this, I mostly just thought it was a pretty wild anecdote about al-Anbari. (Who is now dead.)

Another episode: They [ISIS] sent car bombs [whose aftermath] I witnessed at the Infantry School [in Aleppo]. All of them were outside the school. And a third was in Ourum, where they targeted a checkpoint that belonged to [Harakat Nour al-Din] al-Zinki. A young man was killed, 17 years old, who had nothing to do with it.

So I went to go to [Abu Ali] al-Anbari, the second-in-command in the State, and I said to him, “Sheikh, get matters under control. Fear God for the sake of Muhammad’s nation.”

“We’ve experienced wars,” he said.

I said, “You have the politics of war, but we, as students of knowledge, we’re concerned with the matter of [religious] law! These car bombs are impermissible, they’re killing innocents.” And I told him the events I’d witnessed.

And he said something that would make mountains shake, and this is something to which I will swear. He said, “A car bombs kills twenty, and then the rest are terrified.”

I said, “Your men are killing themselves! They’re not even hurting those you call ‘apostates.’”

“The terror is enough,” he said.

And when things came close to exploding, I said, “Sheikh, save those with you and agree to a court that will rule between by God’s law. The brothers are being killed.”

And he said, “They came to die.”

Original text:

VICE News: "'The Regime Can't Be Trusted': Inside Syria's Aleppo as a Shaky Truce Begins"

New from me and Avi Asher-Schapiro at VICE News:

Aleppo has a new truce, but only after weeks of bloodshed. We spoke to survivors on both sides, plus reps of local rebel brigades and Jabhat al-Nusrah who talked about the city’s deadly shelling and the Nusrah presence in the city’s eastern half that’s been snarling up a new deal.

https://news.vice.com/article/aleppo-syria-bashar-al-assad-regime-russia-united-states-nusra-front-truce

War on the Rocks: "The Tangled Web of the Syrian Jihad"

New: I review Charles Lister’s The Syrian Jihad for War on the Rocks.

The Tangled Web of the Syrian Jihad

The Daily Beast: "One Kurdish Neighborhood in the Crossfire"

New from me on The Daily Beast:

While most of Syria got a ceasefire, Aleppo’s Kurdish al-Sheikh Maqsoud got two months of violence. Rebels and Kurdish forces each claim the other started the running battle on the edge of the neighborhood. Meanwhile, al-Sheikh Maqsoud’s civilians have been dying under apparently indiscriminate shelling – and now, Kurds allege, a chemical weapons strike – with no end in sight.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/04/15/did-syrian-rebels-gas-kurds-in-aleppo.html